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Abstract 
This dissertation analyses assumptions about citizenship education in Malawi since the 
reintroduction of multiparty democracy in 1993 and reveals a minimalist conception of 
citizenship. It asserts that Malawi’s historical and traditional context require concerted 
efforts towards participatory citizenship if democracy is to be strengthened and protected. 
Central to the discussion are conceptual distinctions between minimal and maximal 
citizenship alongside a discussion of concepts of freedom, human rights and development, 
which can be attributed to minimal and maximal conceptions of citizenship. The 
dissertation argues that deliberative and participatory forms of democracy, with their 
parallel notions of contestatory and republican freedoms and rights, are more attuned to 
creating an active and strong citizenship while at the same time developing a positive 
relationship between democratic participation and participation in local and national 
development, a relationship which representative approaches in Malawi seemingly 
disavow. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION IN MALAWI: SETTING THE AGENDA 
1.0 Introduction 
This dissertation argues that citizenship education programmes in Malawi after 1993, when 
the multi-party political system was re-introduced, promote a minimalist conception of 
citizenship. The re-introduction of a multi-party system of government is perceived to be 
synonymous with the re-introduction of democracy although these two developments do 
not mean one and the same thing. The assessment of citizenship education initiatives in 
Malawi will mainly concentrate on assumptions made on the type of citizen deemed as 
appropriate for the democratic dispensation. In order to do this, general underpinnings 
coming from Malawi’s civic education programmes will be considered. Such programmes, 
though predominantly found in community outreach activities, can also be found within the 
school curriculum.  
As a critical response to these developments, the dissertation argues that in order for the 
nation to create conditions where citizens would be enabled to participate fully, a maximal 
conception of democratic citizenship within the frameworks of both deliberation and 
participation is required. In order to do this, the dissertation first embarks on an 
examination of the implications for citizenship education of competing conceptions of 
democracy, which Malawi claims to practise (Chirwa, Kanyongolo & Kayambazinthu, 
2004). These competing conceptions are representation and participatory democracy. 
Crucially related to these competing conceptions of democracy are the links to conceptions 
of freedom, human rights and national development. Such relations will be examined in 
view of the passive forms of citizenship that they are perceived to promote and how 
alternative conceptions of the same are likely to cultivate active and engaging citizenship.  
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1.1  Malawi’s historical setting 
Addressing the task of citizenship education in Malawi after the re-introduction of multi-
party politics in 1993 requires an understanding of its historical context. Malawi’s history 
and politics are marked by lack of proper citizenship education for democracy on the one 
hand, and insufficient citizenship education in cases where that has been attempted. This 
resulted in many people considering participation in politics as specialist issues. For 
instance, the pre-independence period - before 1963 - saw Malawi under British rule in the 
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland1. Some traditional leaders and other political elites 
became allies in the colonial government, where the local people did not define their 
political policies and values.  
As an underdeveloped nation, Malawi’s traditional patterns of life have remained 
predominant, in time and space. In her traditional life, kinship dominates forms of 
leadership and organisation. The ruling family and associated families fulfilled the roles of 
counsellors to the chief. Members of the ruling family exercised full citizenship rights, and 
one such case is the ngoni traditional life and society in Ntcheu district. The rest of the 
members of society were subjects (subordinates) to the chief and the royal family. This 
historical and traditional background is one where it is difficult to find enabling conditions 
for active citizenship2. 
The inability to develop Malawi’s economy through mineral resources turned Malawi into 
an agriculture-based economy and provider of human resources to other parts of the 
                                                
1 The Federation consisted of the current states of Malawi (Nyasaland), Zambia (Northern Rhodesia) and 
Zimbabwe (Southern Rhodesia). 
2 It should be noted here that there is need for an in-depth policy analysis of how the pre-colonial, post-
colonial and the recent multiparty dispensation in Malawi have affected educational policy. This dissertation 
does not assume to mount a full-fledged analysis of the presence or shift of policy regarding citizenship 
education or any other policy shifts apart from the generally observed characteristics that have serious 
ramifications on citizenship preparations. A complete comparative analysis of that sort is beyond the scope 
and nature of this work  
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federation where mining formed the economic core. At a local level, the colonial 
administration also introduced the Thangata System3 (Ross, 1996, p.15). This background 
is indicative of a nation whose citizens did not enjoy or practice active and full human 
agency in the operations of their social and political systems, let alone their traditional 
system. In other words, such a background is also detrimental to the development of a 
required form of citizenship that could see people meaningfully participate in their political 
system and other sectors of society. Hence the background necessitates the cultivation of 
strong and active citizenship. 
In the post-independence period4, education for citizenship was offered through officially 
controlled and structured courses in primary schools known as ‘Civics’. Civics was built 
around and aimed at promoting the national values of Unity, Loyalty, Discipline and 
Obedience. Other than these values, Civics also dealt with issues of public awareness about 
the constitution of the republic, the different parts and functions of government, duties and 
responsibilities of a good citizen in relation to the party dictates, differences between local 
government and central government (Kasambara, 1998, p.239). Despite Kasambara’s 
observations, it is possible to look at Civics with the ordinary spectacles that regard it as 
simply a primary school subject among others. 
Other fora for citizenship education included the various mechanisms put in place by the 
ruling system. Attendance of political rallies was mandatory. The state-owned broadcaster, 
then the only radio in the country, also played a major role. There was also a Youth Week 
every year when citizens had to participate in some development work. The forced 
purchase of party cards became a distinguishing mark of a true citizen. The party card 
                                                
3 The term Thangata means ‘helping without expecting any reward’. In the colonial days natives were 
expected to work on plots of land owned by European estate owners without any payment, in the name of 
developing the nation. 
4 Malawi’s independence was gained in 1964 under the leadership of Dr. Kamuzu Banda and the Malawi 
Congress Party (MCP). In 1971 Dr. K. Banda was made life president of the nation and the MCP became the 
only legal party in the nation (see Fiedler, 1996, p.149) 
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played a crucial role, as it became the sole condition for participation and entrance into 
important places like markets, hospitals, classrooms, bus stages and others. While the 
Malawi Young Pioneers (MYP), a paramilitary wing of the ruling party, mainly acted as 
watchdogs for the system, it also conducted programmes meant to support the ideology of 
the day. Some of these forms of mandatory participation could as well have enabled the 
conditions for cultivating an active citizenship should it not have been for their lack of 
substantive freedoms. 
The different forms and ways of conducting citizenship education as outlined above 
determined and dictated the type of knowledge citizens were getting; who was offering 
what and how it was being offered. In the different ways of imparting citizenship 
education, the type of knowledge that citizens could receive became completely 
determined and dictated by the single party and the state, both in content and methodology. 
One simple analysis of this period also shows that there was no distinction between the 
ruling party and the government as the famous slogan ‘chipani ndi boma’ (literal 
translations: ‘party and government’ or ‘party is government’ and vice versa) attests to. In 
general, the form of citizenship education that was promoted could easily be labelled an 
apology for the single party state, a glorification of the ‘heroism’ of the president and a 
systematic attempt to uncompromisingly rally the nation behind the four national values 
mentioned above. Deviation from this dominant thinking was tantamount to treason. 
Personal identification with the party and its values became the order of the day. In 
addition, Kasambara (1998) argues that there was a concerted effort to keep the masses 
ignorant of extensive and active political awareness and participation and to make the 
masses feel this was their best possible world, which needed their support. Any opposition 
to this ideological hegemony resulted in unceremonious deaths. The president apparently 
 4
endorsed such practices. The president is quoted: “… to those who oppose us, accidents 
will happen…” (Ross, op. cit., p. 17, n.9), after the death of one political opponent.  
The ideal of unity was used for bringing the diverse tribes of Malawi into a feeling of 
nationhood. Unfortunately, by the same value political difference was perceived as 
‘dissidence’, a threat to nationhood and unity itself. Loyalty and obedience mostly operated 
alongside each other. Every Malawian citizen was supposed to show and practice 
allegiance to the ruling Malawi Congress Party and its president. Critical examination of 
the operations of the party and government were considered beyond the range of accepted 
political behaviour. Sentimentally, citizens were encouraged to sacrifice and die for the 
party and the nation. Each member became a watchman for his or her neighbour in so far 
as loyalty and allegiance to the party was concerned. As a result, fear and suspicion were 
instilled in each citizen against each other.  
Discipline became the overriding ‘virtue’ binding citizens in the one party state and the 
ideals and goals of political hegemony in Malawi. Discipline was used to suppress political 
difference. This led to mysterious disappearance of those whose opinions were not blessed 
within mainstream political thinking. Organizations such as the Malawi Youth League and 
the Malawi Young Pioneers played the major role of instilling this discipline into the 
people. These organizations became the most feared and finally turned out to be associated 
with political terror for those who dared to express difference.  
The general citizenship picture of this era strongly attests to the idea that many citizens did 
not have the chance to be participatory citizens in the social and political affairs. This 
historical background shows that Malawi badly needs an appropriate form of citizenship 
education if proper active citizenship engagement is to be developed. The case for active 
citizenship education is made more imperative by additional factors such as Malawi’s 
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demographic conditions. Malawi’s population is largely distributed in terms of 11% urban 
and 89% rural. The illiteracy rate is at 54% and over half of the population lives below the 
poverty line (see UNDP, 2002, Human Development Index and Country Reports 2002). 
Given these demographic features, it is difficult to expect an engaged citizenry. Some have 
argued that such a background further amounted to a deliberate attempt to keep the masses 
ignorant (Kasambara, 1998, p.239).  
Malawi’s background shows that the masses were kept away from meaningful active 
citizenship engagement; that at the inception of a multi-party system of government in 
1993, citizens were ill prepared and ill informed to actively and effectively participate in 
the new democratic process. This further limited their contribution to national 
development. The dissertation argues that most efforts to developing a democratic 
citizenship are more favourable to the development of passive citizenship than the active 
citizenship that Malawi requires. As such, it further proposes a conceptual framework for 
developing active and deliberate democratic citizenship required for the new democratic 
dispensation. 
 
1.2  Imperatives for renewed citizenship education discourse 
The above overview serves to show that Malawi’s historical and traditional context require 
concerted efforts towards participatory citizenship if democracy is to be strengthened and 
protected. The 20th Century democratisation of many countries has mainly been understood 
and practised in relation to structural changes. Setting up of electoral systems, judicial 
structures and other administrative structures in government have been assumed to be the 
essence of democratisation. Alongside such changes, democratisation has also been 
understood as the institution of structures for the protection and promotion of human rights. 
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This dissertation is of the view that such changes have mainly occurred as structural face-
lifts, which to a large extent assume that the structural changes will inevitably lead to the 
cultivation of the democratic character. Structural changes alone are inadequate if we are to 
consistently move towards participatory citizenship because the concentration on such 
changes, although providing the basics, pays little attention to the cultivation of the 
democratic character and what it would take of citizenship for a democracy to thrive. It 
gives the “impression that democracy could effectively function even in the absence of a 
virtuous citizenry” (Kymlicka, 2002, p. 285). Young (1990), Benhabib (1996) and other 
scholars have been in the forefront of proposing alternate spaces in realising democracy by 
transcending a mere pre-occupation with structures. While these proposals do not 
definitively ignore structures per se, priority is placed on full human agency over and 
above the well ordered-ness of the basic society that assumes stability through state 
bureaucracy. 
An over-concentration on structural changes unnecessarily juxtaposes democratic 
structures with the democratic character, resulting in a “democracy of laws and not of men” 
(Gould, 1990. p.283). Change to democratic attitudes and character considered only as a 
side-effect of such structural changes is tantamount to a simplistic understanding of 
character change, let alone what is required of democratic characters. Rawls’ (1971) ideal 
of a democratic society pays more attention to laws than it does to democratic character. 
Such assumptions further imply that non-democratic characters do not make any 
difference, provided sufficient checks and mechanisms are put in place for democracy to 
thrive; provided rules regulating the distribution of resources and deserts are fixed. 
Contrary to these assumptions, Gould (1990) thinks that the prevalence of some traits of a 
democratic character is indispensable though not a sufficient condition for the existence of 
democratic institutional forms (p.285). In other words, democratic institutions and 
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principles are not on their own enough for a democratic culture unless there are democratic 
characters to work in and with the structures and principles. Similarly it is not easy for 
persons to become democrats suddenly, as most African re-introductions of democracy 
would make us believe. The cultivation of strong democratic citizenship is therefore a 
condition for democracy’s success (Gould, 1990). 
Two characteristics of democratic agency and democratic reciprocity are crucial in this 
examination of the democratic character. Democratic agency is the capacity in individuals 
to take rational and free initiative in democratic decision-making as members of society 
(op. cit., p.290). It demands that participating agents have reasons for their collective 
decisions and that they should understand why, as individuals, they are involved in such 
collectivity. Democratic reciprocity “… involves an ability to understand the perspective of 
the other as equivalent to one’s own, and a readiness to act with respect to the other in 
ways that are equivalent to the other’s actions with respect to oneself, as well as to have an 
expectation that the other will understand and act similarly …” (ibid). Democratic 
reciprocity assumes and requires the recognition of each other as unique and equal agents. 
This is a seedbed for the cultivation of other democratic vales such as tolerance, flexibility, 
open mindedness, commitment, responsibility sharing and communication. As such, 
communicative and deliberative conditions need to alter how democratic citizenship is 
conceived and cultivated in Malawi. 
The shift to democratic agency and reciprocity with the purpose of cultivating active 
democratic citizenship has been the centre of democratic discourse in the last decade. 
There is a movement away from mere consideration of constitutional rights, acquisition 
and exercise of power, political decision-making procedures and structures, to 
concentration on the identity and conduct of citizens in relation to their responsibilities, 
loyalties and roles (Kymlicka, 2002, p.285; see also McLaughlin, 1992). Kymlicka also 
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notes, “… the virtues and identities of citizens are an important and independent factor in 
democratic governance…”(ibid). Democracy remains incomplete without any 
consideration of agency.  
 
1.3 Methodological Considerations 
This dissertation is an exercise in applied political philosophy. It seeks to provide a critique 
of educational programmes that are intended to cultivate citizenship identities, skills and 
values. The dissertation will argue that citizenship education programmes in Malawi fail to 
embrace maximal conceptions of citizenship, and as such are very likely to promote 
passive citizenship. On the other hand, an attempt to develop and defend an active 
citizenship will be made, relying on a participatory concept of democracy that promises to 
bring about a strong and deliberative democracy. This theoretical agenda, while not 
necessarily polarising the major themes of representation and participation, and the 
competing perspectives in the associated conceptions of human rights, freedom and 
development, will consider these themes using a ‘minimal–maximal’ conceptual 
framework (McLaughlin, 1992). The framework will be used to examine the tensions and 
ambiguities that exist between representative and participatory forms of democracy; 
between contestatory forms, and formal and abstract notions of freedom and rights; and the 
dichotomous relations between development and democratic participation and citizenship.  
The maximal and minimal interpretations of the notion of citizenship are understood to 
exist in a continuum and not necessarily as discrete conceptions (McLaughlin, 1992, 
p.236). Such a conception further implies that, in the first place, it is possible to have 
interpretations that are neither completely minimal nor maximal, that is, features can tend 
towards the minimal while others tend towards the maximal in the same system. Hence 
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citizenship characterisations stretch between limited and extended forms. For example, 
considering human rights as universal and applicable to everyone in the same way tends to 
be minimal for it to be practical but overlooks difference and need, and the contention 
arising from the latter that may require preferential treatment. Secondly, the nature of the 
continuum in citizenship conceptions gives room for interpretations to be dynamic. The 
interpretations can take different general characterizations or faces depending on 
concentration or focus. For instance, people’s political involvement can fluctuate between 
the barest forms of involvement such as in voting, to more extended forms like frequent 
deliberations on the issues that affect one’s society and continuous action to realise 
society’s common good.  
McLaughlin (1992) develops the minimal-maximal characterisations of the concept of 
citizenship in four features. These are “…the identity that is seen as conferring upon an 
individual, the virtues of the citizen that are required, the extent of the political involvement 
on the part of the individual that is thought to follow, and the social prerequisites seen as 
necessary for effective citizenship…” (op. cit., p.236, emphasis original). I suggest that it is 
possible to consider that identity and virtues are the major features of any such 
characterisations; and that the political involvement and social pre-requisites are necessary 
consequents of these major features. In other words, for the purposes of this dissertation the 
two major features suffice to mark a distinction between the maximal and minimal 
interpretations of citizenship. 
Minimal interpretations of citizenship are marked by an emphasis on formal, legal and 
juridical status. Citizenship similarly gets its meaning through formal definitions and 
enforcements of rights, which definitively take shape in constitutional rights. The 
individual person becomes both a recipient of rights from government and its constitution 
and an executor of human rights to promote and protect self. Similarly, citizenship 
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education emphasizes knowledge of the law and individuals’ rights to vote in order to 
choose leaders. This form of citizenship requires virtues whose loyalties and 
responsibilities only stretch as far as the local community is involved. Being a law-abiding 
citizen and volunteering in some public works is also recommended. Therefore, minimal 
citizenship does not carry any more burdens than following the law and some periodical 
volunteer work, which is not an obligation either. In other words, I argue that this model 
does not encourage widespread citizen involvement in public things. Once the vote is cast 
and the rights are secured an individual need have little to do with the daily affairs of 
society. Representatives are perceived as properly positioned to engage in active 
participation. I will argue that in public life, such forms of citizenship are likely to promote 
passive citizens whose considerations are mostly formal, and legal. This can also be 
attributed to their lack of collective perspective and proper interaction, which eventually 
consolidates the identities, thereby remaining static.  
On the other hand, McLaughlin’s maximal forms of citizenship, other than being multi-
dimensional, require forms of community consciousness that stretch beyond the local and 
the immediate as one is moved by a sense of the common good in the light of universal 
considerations (op. cit., p.236). Forms of citizenship that demand extended participation of 
citizens in most cases also require that citizens deliberate over matters of common concern. 
Such deliberation is likely to create a shared and extended culture of democratic rights, 
responsibilities and obligations. These forms make citizenship dynamic, not confined to 
constitutional issues, though they are important; and they promote justice. Such forms of 
citizenship are likely to encourage and develop active participation in the public realm in 
which citizenship also gets defined. Continued re-definition, debate and contestation over 
the identities and virtues as is the case in maximal orientations is most likely to produce 
active citizens.  
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This dissertation contends that education for democratic citizens must adopt a maximal 
approach. Given that educating for democratic citizens is not simply general education 
meant to promote philosophic/rational inquiry into the nature of government or elections 
(op. cit.), it is important that such an education for democratic citizens should seek to 
achieve a specific range of dispositions and virtues that enable citizens to live in and 
support their democratic political economy. The Crick Report (1998) argues that the 
purpose of citizenship education “… is to make secure and to increase the knowledge, 
skills and values relevant to the nature and practices of participative democracy. The above 
values also enhance awareness of rights and duties, and the sense of responsibilities needed 
for the development of active citizens ... thereby establishing the value of involvement in 
the local and wider community…” (p.40). 
This model for educating citizens conceives of active citizenship as the engagement in a 
habitual interaction between the legal, the moral and political arenas of public life (Crick 
report, p.11). Educating for democratic citizenship in Malawi would also have to come to 
terms with the need for a sound knowledge of basic concepts of democratic life such as 
human rights and the institutional operations of a democratic government. But such a 
concentration of the knowledge system does not make democracy itself secure (Crick 
Report, p.8); neither does it provide sufficient conditions for citizen engagement in civic 
affairs. Whereas civic participation is desired for its capacity to enable citizens to become 
active in their affairs, the proposal for active citizenship does not ultimately rule out certain 
forms of representation at some levels, for example where national decisions are called for. 
The participating citizen is one who lives through a culture of human rights and freedom 
that goes beyond the constitutional framework to an ongoing consideration of how such 
rights and freedoms are negotiated and exercised in daily social and public life. In other 
words, teaching for active citizenship would need to include the cultivation of social and 
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moral responsibility, community involvement and not merely imparting political 
knowledge. These values are believed to assist in teaching self-confidence, and socially 
and morally responsible behaviour and community involvement (Crick Report, p.12). The 
dissertation also proposes that such a citizenship model is also better positioned to foster 
participation in local and national development. Education for active citizenship should 
therefore create sufficient conditions for the cultivation of values and dispositions, skills 
and aptitudes, and also knowledge and understanding necessary for active participation in 
society. (Op. cit., p.41) 
As such, any education for citizenship that pretends to be apolitical, as is the case with the 
National Initiative for Civic Education programmes in Malawi and other community and 
school programmes, misses out being a legitimate civic education for democratic citizens. 
The concentration on formal government structures, forms of democracy, formal human 
rights and their constitutional and structural protection, while it informs the citizens, is 
likely to undermine the promotion of active citizenship! 
 
1.4 Outline of the argument. 
In setting the agenda for a maximal conception of citizenship in Malawi, this chapter has 
undertaken the task of indicating that citizenship programmes in use after the re-
introduction of a multi-party system in Malawi are likely to promote an unengaged and 
passive citizenry. Nevertheless, Malawi’s historical and traditional context set an 
imperative to create concerted efforts towards participatory citizenship if democracy is to 
be strengthened and protected. Malawi’s historical background, both pre- and post-
independence, and the four cornerstones adopted in the post-independence period do not 
provide enabling conditions for the development of active democratic citizenship. I make 
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this notation in consideration of the global trends that point towards newer forms of 
democratisation where democratic agency and reciprocity have become a renowned mark 
of these forms (Gould, 1990). The chapter also sets out a theoretical methodology of the 
maximal-minimal shifts in order to clarify the competing conceptions and their influence in 
cultivating democratic citizenship. The subsequent chapters provide a critical analysis of 
competing conceptions of democracy, freedom, human rights and their implications for 
development. Analysis of these themes provides a better ground for understanding 
citizenship. 
Chapter Two discusses the competing conceptions of democracy and their roles in 
developing active citizenship. These conceptions refer to representative forms and 
participatory forms. The analysis shows that notions of representation and participation 
should not be understood simplistically for each of them contains a continuum of 
interpretation within itself. The analysis, while appreciating the strengths of extended 
forms of representation as presented by Pitkin (1996), ultimately settles for direct 
democracy because of its strong participatory and deliberative incentives, and their 
capacity to teach citizenship through participation. The chapter concludes that a maximal, 
participatory conception of democracy is more appropriate to citizenship education for 
strong democracy than a minimal, representative one. 
I further suggest that the two competing conceptions need to be considered in terms of the 
freedoms and rights they allow for citizenship. Within this understanding, chapter three 
further explores a continuum within each of the concepts. This continuum also has 
relevance in understanding both minimal and maximal forms of citizenship. Nevertheless, 
the discussion settles on the republican conception as appropriate for developing active 
citizenship and considers the liberal conception as limiting, though providing a basic 
framework for democratic change. The chapter finally draws a parallel between republican 
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forms of freedom and dynamic conceptions of human rights, and argues that this 
combination is likely to promote active citizenship education. Formal concepts, on the 
other hand, do not move far enough towards developing the required dispositions for active 
citizenship, although they provide a basic framework for democratisation. 
Chapter four addresses the relationship between development and democracy in the 
preparation for citizenship. Among other things, the chapter reveals the dichotomous way 
in which development, and citizenship education and democratisation, are associated in the 
Africa region - in Malawi in particular. This analysis stretches from a synopsis of this 
relationship in the first independent states of Africa, to current positions within the New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). The chapter further claims that the 
apparent dichotomy between development and democracy in citizenship education can be 
resolved using Amartya Sen’s approach that understands ‘freedom as development’, 
thereby consolidating maximal notions of citizenship in participatory democracy with a 
republican notion of freedom and human rights. 
Our last major chapter, Chapter Five, unpacks and analyses themes and approaches to 
citizenship education in Malawi in relation to the major themes of the conceptions of 
democracy, human rights, freedom and development that chapters two to four consider. In 
this chapter I proceed by considering the lack of proper citizenship education in the pre-
independence period, and under the leadership of Dr. Banda. I also show that the equation 
of voter education to civic education as a whole in the first years of multi-party democracy 
is inadequate. In fact, I argue that the activities undertaken in this period in the name of 
citizenship education, while providing the required basic knowledge for democratic 
citizenship, fall short of providing adequate conditions for the cultivation of active 
democratic citizenship. I finally settle for a practise-based approach to citizenship 
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education in contrast to a sole concentration of the knowledge of the structures and 
constitution.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP: REPRESENTATIVE AND /OR 
PARTICIPATORY 
2.1 Introduction 
In order to understand the challenges confronting citizenship and education for democratic 
citizenship in Malawi and to understand how best the concept of citizenship can be applied, 
we need to examine two competing conceptions of democratic theory. These are 
representative and participatory democracy. I make this consideration because the 
resurgence of the citizenship debate is a prominent theme in recent democratic theory. 
While my account in this dissertation aims at ultimately defending participatory models of 
democracy, representative and participatory democracy should not be simplistically 
contrasted. Some representative models, if properly conceived and used, can promote 
active citizenship. But, I shall argue that participatory modes of democracy are better 
positioned to promote active citizenship. 
 
2.2 Representative democracy: an exploration 
Mill (1996), among others, thinks that representative democracy is the most practical form 
of democracy; that in contemporary discourses of democracy, this form is obviously 
assumed to be the norm.5. Bearing in mind the prevalence of the democratic ideal, the 
assumption that representation is an obvious case when democracy is being considered 
                                                
5 My starting point for this discussion is aware of the belief, among many scholars, that an exploration of 
democratic theory needs to pay serious attention to its historical development. However my passion for 
participatory democracy demands this particular approach so that the limitations of representation are made 
evident. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that direct and participatory democracy is the earliest form of 
democracy. 
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calls for serious critique. Other scholars like Giddens (1994, p.112) locate the theory of 
representative democracy within liberal democracy and liberal theory in general. Dahl 
traces the prevalence of the notion to the monarchical periods of the Swedish and the 
British (Dahl, 1989, p.29). According to Dahl (1989), representation referred to the non-
democratic procedure in running the affairs of the state where a king or any monarch had 
the prerogative of summoning community representatives to give input to specific issues of 
government. It is further considered that the idea of representation saw its way into 
political systems with an extended meaning when monarchies were phasing out. Hence, the 
idea became associated with the enlargement of the people’s right to vote (Bobbio, 1989), 
and an elected position became synonymous to ‘representation’. 
Dahl (1989) further notes, “… by joining the democratic idea of rule by the people to the 
non-democratic use of representatives, democracy started taking up a new form and 
dimension…” (p.29). Nevertheless, others see this transformation to the concept of 
representation as an introduction of an anti-democracy but one that is supported by the 
majority (Hirst & Khilmani, 1993, p.160), although that democratic representation was 
developed primarily to secure government from any single majority.  
This historical foreground has, in our time, led to the perception that representative 
democracy means extending the people’s rights to vote through universal suffrage. Hence 
democracy becomes associated primarily with electoral systems and political leadership. 
The historical development of representation has also shifted democracy from its classical 
domain of involving all citizens to a point where only a few are involved except in voting. 
This has led to the creation of autonomous institutions, like parliamentary, cabinet, interest 
groups, etc, as indispensable for a successful large-scale democracy (Dahl, 1989, p.30). 
Political parties and their competition for people’s vote originate from this understanding.  
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2.2.1 Representative democracy’s competing claims 
Theoretical claims within representation can also be understood as lying in a maximal–
minimal continuum, depending on the level of participation citizens are conceived to have. 
As such, representative forms stretch between high and low forms; between simple 
allowance to participate in the electoral vote to continuous and full citizen engagement in 
the running of the affairs of the state while the representatives mediate in order to arrive at 
final tangible decisions. Pitkin (1996) thinks that the different forms of representation are 
largely dependent on “… what is represented … the nature of interests, welfare, or wishes 
… capacities of representative and constituents, and the nature of issues the representative 
must deal with …” (p.418). Pitkin argues that representation is less likely to be consultative 
when it concerns a priori decision making on what is good for citizens. If we use 
‘Burkean’ representation, political representation becomes representation of interests not 
particular or special to any one person or group of persons such that the group defines this 
interest (ibid). Hence the representative acquires “… a superior elite of wisdom and reason 
…” (Pitkin, p.419). On the other hand, the more one sees political issues as involving 
arbitrary and irrational choices, the more representation cannot proceed without consulting 
those for whom one is acting (ibid). In this case, the interests and wants of the people are 
perceived to be best definable by the people themselves. This understanding allows for 
more substantive representation. 
‘Burkean’ representation is manifested in Schumpeter’s (1954) proposal that limits popular 
participation to periodic election of representatives, thereby promoting a formalistic 
understanding of representation. Representation is conceived as merely a “… system of 
arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of 
a competitive struggle for people’s votes …” (Schumpeter in Kariel, 1970, p. 17). This 
understanding stands over and against an assumed classical notion of representation, which 
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entertains that there should be a “…definite and rational opinion about every individual 
question in society…” (Mill, 1996, p.14). In this form of representation, people choose the 
representatives in order to effectively bring this will to its actualisation. On the other hand, 
Schumpeter (1954) claims that there is no commonly perceived sense of the good to the 
extent that what one sees as good has no guarantee of applying to another. Similarly, he 
discards as ridiculous the conception of an ‘obvious good’ that would also guide in making 
national policies. 
Schumpeter’s position relies on an assumed monistic interpretation of the classical 
understanding of the common good and society. Hence, the argument: “…different 
individuals and groups have varied conceptions of the good and are bound to conceive a 
common good differently…” (Schumpeter, 1954, p.15). According to him, we cannot 
determine or translate what the good means to every individual person. This stance leads to 
the abolition of ‘general will’ as presented in some contractual and democratic theorists. 
Schumpeter’s dominant assumptions create an elite democracy where the citizens only 
have the power to choose their representatives but have no power to effectively and 
substantively control them. Citizens hand over power of self-rule to their representatives 
through the vote; and once chosen, the leaders will only quit office when voted out in a 
follow-up general election. Therefore, Schumpeter’s democracy is:  
…a political method, … a certain type of institutional arrangement for arriving at 
political–legislative and administrative–decisions and hence incapable of being 
an end in itself, irrespective of what decisions it will produce under given 
historical conditions … (Schumpeter, 1957, p.242) 
Schumpeter’s democracy becomes a tool for deciding questions of leadership of 
government. Hence democracy’s value lies in it being a method only and not an end in 
itself or a way of life (see by contrast Dewey, 1970).  
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A connection can be drawn between Schumpeter’s ideal of democracy and his economic 
theories. Schumpeter’s economic theory favours market or capital monopoly and not 
liberal market competition. He thinks that monopolistic practices in the economy are good 
because they are the seedbeds of innovation and new products (Schumpeter, 1957, Chapter 
VIII: Monopolistic Practices, pp. 87–106). Although he acknowledges that competition is 
always imperfect in both spheres of life (p.271), he thinks that when competition in politics 
is associated with competition for a free vote, democracy becomes justified. But then the 
competition is primarily a drive to get a monopoly of the votes from the electorate so that 
one becomes elected as a democratic leader. 
Democracy through Schumpeter’s eyes becomes ‘clientele democracy’. In this democracy, 
the politician has his or her goods through which s/he seeks to satisfy the customers, the 
electorate. But understanding democracy from this perspective would introduce difficulties 
in considering the level of personal freedom citizens enjoy in relation to their political 
arrangements and the level of civic engagement in public matters, except for those periods 
designated for the political mechanism of ruler-selection. Such a ‘clientele democracy’ is 
void of a common good, except for the apparent smooth operation of the system. People 
are individualised, each in one’s own pursuance of selfish goals; and the leader and the 
electorate become juxtaposed. Furthermore, while the citizens in their masses cannot 
rationally aggregate their wishes into some common good to stand as a beacon light of 
policy, it can be deduced that those vying for positions of leadership either have the 
capacity to see the much needed direction that the rest need, or that what these leaders 
think is by itself good, something to be pursued by the whole group (Schumpeter, in Kariel, 
1970, p.15). The view controversially assumes different levels of rationality between 
people, a denial of humanity to the electorate despite the truth that goodness is perceived 
differently between individuals. 
 21
In relation to citizenship education, Schumpeter’s views would be taken to mean that we 
need to place enough emphasis on leadership qualities and skills in the process of 
educating the citizens. Our citizenship education among others would include such features 
as: the electoral process, legislation conditioning the electoral process, positions of 
leadership and required duties, conditions for such positions in clear distinction to the ruled 
or the followers. As a way of clearly marking the roles of leadership and general 
citizenship, a Schumpeterian format of education is also very likely to promote people’s 
knowledge of their human rights, constitutions, and other judicial procedures. These are the 
bases on which success or lack of success for people chosen into positions of power would 
be assessed! A Schumpeterian education draws some similarity with Plato’s proposal for 
the training of ‘philosopher kings’ in distinction to the education of the masses. 
Schumpeter’s education for citizenship would only be for the leaders, who in his mind bear 
the torch of light. 
Similarly, Schumpeter can also be thought of as proposing the idea that citizens need not 
meddle in politics, the daily running of the state, except when they have to choose a 
representative. Democracy is reduced to democratic choice of leaders as citizens are called 
in only periodically. What makes this type of democracy limited in terms of Pitkin’s 
framework is the fact that citizens are not engaged in running their own political affairs 
except in determining who wins in the race for political leadership. The common citizen 
and his or her capacities are not trusted enough to let them run their own civic affairs. This 
view leaves the politician with the capability and hopefully the public trust to conceive and 
construct what may be good to all the citizens. 
Mill’s (1996) idea of representation, on the other hand, accommodates citizen capacity to 
formulate political opinions and make decisions through continuous citizen engagement in 
political issues beyond the ballot. His initial proposal offers a form of government where 
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every member of society takes some part in the running of such a government. He argues 
that it is only by personal participation that “…the rights and interests of every, or any 
persons are secure from being disregarded…” (p.336). Participation forms one of the basic 
means of ensuring that what one wants is achieved and protected. Secondly, he argues that 
such involvement or participation tends to increase a person’s capacity to exercise one’s 
rights and interests thereby also increasing the range and level of participation.  
According to Mill (1996), some of the merits of this citizen engagement in society include 
defeating tendencies to selfishness. By promoting the interests of the whole one would see 
to it that one’s interests are also cared for. Mill argues: “… by their own hands only (italic 
mine) can any positive and durable improvement of their circumstances in life be worked 
out…” (Mill, p.337). In other words, people can avoid social injustices and crime by jointly 
creating and participating in a free society of equals. In fact, he emphasizes “…the 
participation of all as the ideally perfect conception of free government…” (p.338). 
Mills’ illustration of a contented character as opposed to an uncontented character clearly 
illustrates this understanding. The contented spirit takes pride in achieving a specific status 
in life and wants to keep the attained status. As result, this spirit stagnates at one position 
and rarely moves forward because there is “…no ambition to make any one else happier, to 
promote the good of their country or their neighbourhood, or to improve themselves in 
moral excellence …” (Mill, p.339). The uncontented spirit, on the other hand, is engaged in 
life for the sake of improving itself and others. “… Thus, the active, self-helping character 
is not only intrinsically the best, but is the likeliest to acquire all that is really excellent or 
desirable” (p.340). Mill’s understanding promotes active people’s capacities and faculties 
as they continuously struggle against limitation and barriers in life towards some desired 
good. Such engagement of the faculties does not only lead to the achievement of the 
desired goals, but also improves the faculties used to reach the desired goal. Hence 
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participation educates! No wonder Mill (1996) also thinks that “… people who think it is a 
shame when anything goes wrong – who rush to the conclusion that the evil could and 
ought to have been prevented, are those who, in the long run, do most to make the world 
better…” (ibid).  
The inactivity of mind and of aspiration that bothers Mill can lead a government to be 
complacent about its duties to the citizens; hence no improvement happens. Elite 
governments are naturally at home with passive citizens because the elite’s status quo is 
less put to a challenge. Alternatively, properly democratic states that recognise and practise 
the equality of citizen should promote an active citizenship, which means perpetual 
dissatisfaction with any status quos. Such dissatisfaction remains meaningful to the extent 
that engaged citizens see it within themselves to improve life and not to expect others as 
more entitled to assist them improve their life. Mill (1996) conclusively states, “… any 
government that can satisfy the needs of the social state is the one where the whole 
participate, … and that the participation should everywhere be as great as the general 
degree of improvement of the community will allow, and that nothing less can be 
ultimately desirable, than the admission of all to share in the sovereign power of the state 
…” (P. 342). Nevertheless, his position is ridden with some ambiguities on such things as: 
at what point can a person meaningfully participate? Who decides on what people will 
participate in? 
Despite the elaborate explanations of the nature of personal continuous participation in 
affairs that concern one and the merits thereof, Mill does not believe that such participation 
is practicable because of the large sizes of modern populations. This creates the necessity 
for a representative system of government. At this point, Mill alters his concept of what a 
perfect government is. He uses the same phrases in defences of the participation and 
representation simultaneously (see Mill, 1996, pp.336 & 342). Hence, it is difficult to say 
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Mill believes in the beneficial consequences of a popular government except when you 
aggregate. He insists that sovereign power in society needs to be vested in the entire 
aggregate of the community. But aggregational processes are not so much interested in the 
processes as in the ultimate results. Mill’s use of the aggregational concept leaves the much 
deserved concept of popular government to a body of representatives chosen by all the 
people through which all people are seen to take charge of their government for what he 
refers to as better execution (Mill, p.342-344). Nevertheless, Mill’s (1986) representative 
system is only a bridge between government machinery and the general will of the people, 
as the representative ensures that “…every interest and shade of opinion is passionately 
represented…” (Chapter v). 
Mill’s conceptual framework has serious implications in an educational context. In the first 
place, his insistence on participation as a factor for the improvement of moral and 
intellectual faculties of the person directs to the idea of local participation of members of 
society as good for their own social and moral development. This reasoning further implies 
that teaching and learning of democratic citizenship needs to be grounded in practice. In 
fact one would need to know democracy and democratic citizenship by experiencing and 
living it at local level before bringing this practice to a wider horizon. The participation of 
citizens in government develops an active character and promotes the good management of 
society as a whole. Mill’s proposal calls for commitment on all stakeholders (see Mill, 
1996, p.350-355). 
Despite the educative strengths in Mill’s representative model, Pitkin (1967 & 1996) 
presents a competitive format of citizen engagement in representation that is also 
substantive. Pitkin believes that both the representative and those to be represented are 
independent and rational persons. As such, each of the two sides in their own right and 
capacity is capable of independent action and judgement. In other words, representation 
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does not mean the represented are incapable of independent judgement and action in the 
running of their public affairs. Political representation therefore takes on the notion of 
‘taking care of’. This idea of representation demands that the process of representation be 
characterised with reasons that people may have for a particular objective or objection in 
their political processes. Conversely, it also means that the represented should be able to 
see why their representative would want to represent them in a particular way should there 
be some difference. In other words, it is not in the interest of substantive representation to 
have the wishes of the two groups, representative and represented, always at odds (Pitkin, 
1996, p.418). 
Pitkin’s substantive concept of representation strikes a balance between the power and 
capacities of the representative and those of the people being represented. While the 
representative in the process of representation is neither an expert nor a complete brute, 
“…who merely consults and reflects without (personally) acting…” (p.419), “…the people 
on the other hand are not like helpless children who simply have to be helped without 
seeking their substantial input…” (p.421). Substantive political representation does not 
necessarily require a genius or an elite because such a person would not see the need to 
consult before representing the will of the people. In fact Pitkin (1966) is of the view that 
political issues do not present themselves in black and white thereby demanding easy 
answers that could be delivered without listening to the other party. Political issues are by 
their very nature controversial (see also Rawls, 1971, Young, 1990). Because of the 
bargaining, compromise and conflict involved in all political issues, Pitkin proposes that 
the representative must pursue his constituents’ interest in a manner at least responsive to 
their wishes, and that conflict between them must be justifiable in terms of that interest 
(p.420). In relation to the differences between local and national interests in representation, 
she proposes that “…local and partial interests should not be ruthlessly overridden and 
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sacrificed in the name of the nation; neither should the local and partial interests outweigh 
the needs and interests of the nation as a whole…” (p.422). 
In Pitkin’s understanding, it can further be drawn that when it comes to representation the 
two interests are not necessarily antagonistic just because they arise from two different 
perspectives of society. The conflict between the local and the national is only apparent. 
Quite subtly, Pitkin looks at representation from a holistic perspective. Other than 
considering representation from the commonsensical perspective of an individual 
representing a particular society or group of people by presenting a particular view or 
objective, she considers political representation as involving the whole public in its many 
complex ways of life or social arrangements. The “…overall structure and functioning of 
the system, the patterns emerging from the multiple activities of many people …” (p.425) 
become the centre of representation. Substantive representation takes the heart of the 
people’s wishes and blends them into national interests and goals. The role of the 
representative becomes that of safeguarding the public interest.  
Pitkin’s format of substantive representation can be regarded as more usable in school 
governing bodies because of the dual authority she gives to both the representative and the 
represented. But what makes substantive representation crucial, in Pitkin’s view, is the 
place and role that it gives to the general public, otherwise also referred to as the masses. 
All the citizens are ideally given space to participate in running the affairs of their 
government by maintaining continuous influence on what the representative will represent 
them on and how, whenever such issues arise. This representation gives the masses a 
chance to be informed or become educated on how the whole political system operates. 
Government actions and affairs become their affairs too. The development of people’s 
capacities to state, reason about and defend their wishes; to communicate what they want; 
to negotiate their wishes amongst themselves and between themselves and the 
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representative, become some of the important objectives of citizenship education that is 
meant to foster representative democracy. 
Can representation achieve what it promises to deliver? The above analysis shows that 
representative models of democracy exist in a continuum, consisting of both low and high 
forms of citizen participation. Schumpeter's elite representation does not give as much 
space to the citizens in general as it gives the elite leaders. The general public participates 
only in terms of choosing their leaders and thereafter the leaders engage in continuous 
decision making processes in the public life of the state or country. On the other hand, 
substantive representation allows for full citizen control of representatives by the general 
public. This involves citizens choosing what issues to discuss and actual discussion of 
issues that affect them. In other cases, citizens maintain effective influence over their 
representative (Mill, Pitkin). Models of representation that allow for extensive citizen 
participation in their affairs do not, nevertheless, succeed in resolving the dilemma that 
exists between which roles one can ascribe to representatives and which ones can be 
ascribed to the represented, in the whole political process. Given that there is more public 
participation, will the representatives be reduced to mere conduits of the people’s will or 
will they still apply their rational judgment over the issues the citizens have already 
decided upon? Pitkin keeps the representatives and the represented in tandem. In this 
arrangement, problems are likely to arise in cases where the citizens are not prepared to 
express their will to the representatives. And as such the level of participation 
distinguishing the representative from the represented is something not definitively settled.  
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2.3 The case for participatory forms of democracy 
Despite the promises of participation that one finds in extended forms of representation, I 
claim that representative approaches to citizenship education are not sufficiently proactive. 
Barber (1984) for instance, accuses representation of making the voter free only on the day 
that he or she casts the vote. Beyond the ballot, the citizen enjoys less control of the 
democratic system, thereby faring badly in terms of teaching citizens freedom (Barber, 
p.145). In general practice, representative systems rarely seek for continuous citizen 
consent in the governing system, giving the impression that “… the instant a people allows 
itself to be represented, it loses its freedom …” (Barber, {quoting Rousseau, The Social 
Contract, book 3, chap. 15}, ibid). This view claims that once people have been 
legitimately represented through the ballot, it is as if they have also surrendered their 
freedom through the imminent representation. The people are reduced to the level of 
abstract personhood, characterized by legal and electoral equity (p.146). Such a conception 
omits the other crucial factors that shape and give meaning to human life such as the social 
and communal ties that exist between individuals in society. To that extent, Barber thinks 
the conception predominant in representative democracy is also incompatible with social 
justice because it robs people of their freedom and equality.  
Calls for participation of citizens in affairs that affect them have at times been considered 
as nostalgia for the past, especially for the ancient Greek city states and their way of 
politics. Nevertheless, current participatory theorists do not conceive participation from 
this perspective. Instead, participation has largely been considered as a challenge to the 
liberal tradition’s over-protection of individual autonomy in public affairs (Gutman, 1995, 
p.411). Gutman considers low voter turnout and the acceleration of corruption and public 
non-accountability as direct results of limited and inadequate political understanding and 
information that representative forms offer to citizens (ibid). According to this 
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understanding, representative forms of democracy shift focus from making politics an issue 
of all to being an issue of a privileged few. The masses on the other hand look at politics 
with disdain and as something that has to be avoided if one wants to concentrate on one’s 
development.  
The avoidance of politics and direct participation in politics by the citizens is much to 
citizens’ own disadvantage. Direct citizen participation in the political increases the 
citizens’ understanding of politics and their political system. This increases their level of 
participation (Gutman, p.411). Thus, politics does not remain too complex to be the domain 
of ordinary citizens anymore. Once the barriers to political knowledge are removed, the 
assumed complexities of politics become the habitus of all the people in society. 
Nevertheless, I use Gutman’s notion of political participation not to imply a simplistic 
understanding of politics. Far from it, all politics is complex otherwise it becomes an 
administration of the public. Barber (1984) neatly brings home this sense of politics when 
he argues:  
… The need for politics arises when some action of public consequence becomes 
necessary and when men (women, addition mine) must make a public choice that 
is reasonable in the face of conflict despite the absence of an independent ground 
of judgment… (Barber, 1984, p.122, emphasis original). 
Politics is distinguished from other realms when people have to make decisions and act on 
issues that do not only have a bearing on the individual but also on the whole group. Its 
decisions and actions necessarily become public. In addition, issues become political when 
they can neither be black nor white, in the sense that there are no easy answers until all the 
people have a negotiated understanding of how reasonable choices to all could be arrived 
at. The moment that such issues are sorted by a ground of judgment that the people have 
opted for in their particular circumstances, such issues lose their political characteristics 
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(Barber, 1984). Barber’s re-definition of politics necessarily becomes democratic and 
participatory. The stress that conflict between reasonable choices marks the political 
necessitates a continuous process of political negotiation. Through this process participants 
acquire knowledge of themselves and their political life (see Barber, pp. 122-131). Barber’s 
argument concludes that it is only strong democracy of a participatory mode that offers the 
basic conditions of political life (op.cit., p.121). The concept of ‘strong democracy’ has a 
number of far reaching implications for other central themes in conceptualising citizenship 
such as issues of autonomy, which this dissertation discusses in the following chapter. 
Pitkin’s (1996) line of argument (above) is wrongly understood and labelled as a matter of 
representation, substantive or not. In fact she defends participation primarily and holds that 
political issues lie in the intermediate range where questions about action involve both facts 
and value commitments; both ends and means; thereby making the political a 
“…combination of bargaining and compromise, and common deliberation about public 
policy, to which facts and rational argument are relevant…” (Pitkin, 1996, pp.419-420). 
The nature of political matters as described by Pitkin leads more to the conclusion that we 
cannot leave political matters to experts because much as there are no black and white 
demarcations in that which is political (Barber, 1984, pp120-3), such issues also involve 
values that we hold dear to ourselves. This is more the reason why individuals need to 
represent their own ideas and values; hence the need for direct citizen participation in 
politics. 
The ideal of participation has several merits in a democratic government (see also section 
2.2 above). In the first place participation creates the conditions under which self-
development will take place. According to Mill (1996) people are better protected and safe 
when they endeavour to protect themselves and depend on their own capacities than they 
would be by relying on others. Mill states: “… by their own hands only can any positive 
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and durable improvement of their circumstances in life be worked out…” (op. cit., p.337). 
The desire to keep moving, to accomplish new things for ourselves and for others result 
from our speculative and practical talent. Hence, Mill (1996) regards three varieties of 
mental excellence as a fruit of active effort. These mental excellences refer to the 
intellectual, practical and moral capacities (op. cit., p.338). According to this 
understanding, only those characters that struggle with natural obstacles in a drive to reach 
fresher heights improve human life. The active and the energetic are better positioned to 
promoting the advantage of each individual member of community as well as their own 
advantage. Citizen political participation that assumes the activity of all members of 
society is similarly better placed for the improvement of the members’ own faculties. 
Participation educates! 
The concept of participation as an ideal of citizen engagement in civic affairs is also central 
in republican formulations of democratic citizenship. The republican version considers 
participation from two points of views. On the one hand, individual members’ participation 
is conceived as an end in itself and is equated with public order, the public good 
(Kymlicka, 2002, pp.294-312). This view holds that participation is itself good. 
Participation becomes the desired end of every society and the wish of every citizen in 
society. Hence, teaching citizens to get involved with their political life leads them to 
achieve their own desired end. Therefore, traditional republican theory or Aristotelian 
Republicanism as Kymlicka (2002) calls it, holds that participation in the public is good in 
itself, and the goal of all activity. On the other hand, non-participation becomes a sign of 
unfulfilled and incomplete civic life on the part of the citizens.  
 On the other hand, Kymlicka (2002) argues that ‘modern republicanism’ conceives 
participation as neither constitutive of public order nor valuable in itself. Participation is an 
extrinsic good, directing members of society to achieve the intrinsic good for which they 
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are members of society. Modern republicanism emphasizes a strong civic character and 
public spirit, and the willingness of citizens to join in union as one state. The republican 
active citizenship embraces all the aspect of public life, and promotes both the individual 
and the group. Participation is a crucial factor for the cultivation of public virtue or civility.  
This dissertation defends a preference for democratic participation as a means to certain 
civil goods. The conception that “participation equals democracy” is a dangerous position 
because not all participation amounts to democracy; otherwise ethnic cleansing could have 
been democratic for masses have participated in this for a long time in history. Democratic 
participation is different from other forms of participation for it only meets that criterion 
within democratic conditions such as freedom, equality and others. As such, the teaching of 
political involvement as an end in itself is not a viable alternative. The idea of participation 
as having an extrinsic value, on the other hand, enables participating citizens to acquire 
civility and other virtues that hold society together and make human life meaningful (see 
Kymlicka, ibid). Teaching citizens the knowledge, skills, values and attitudes that are 
expected from a republican citizen enables the citizen to play an active role in political 
debates and decision-making (Kymlicka, 2002, Miller, 2000, Crick, 2000, pp.343–346). 
This education enables citizens to participate in order to cultivate civility and other virtues 
and also enables them to advance in self-development. 
The idea and practice of direct citizen participation has been the major bone of contention 
between those advocating representative democracy and advocates of direct democracy6. 
National programmes of democratisation, for instance, have in many cases uncritically 
taken direct democracy to be impossible simply because of large populations in nations. 
Kayambazinthu, Chirwa and Kanyongolo (2004) writing on Malawi, argue that 
                                                
6 Direct Democracy refers to a system of government where all citizens are assumed to participate directly in 
all processes that concern their government (see Chirwa, C., Kanyongolo, E., & Kayambazinthu, E. 2004, 
p.92). Its theoretical expositions date back to ancient Greek democracy. In modern day, it is regarded to be 
the modus operandi of small associations and clubs  
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participatory democracy is not possible because it requires everyone to have a say in major 
governance issues. According to this view, expecting participatory democracy from current 
nations would either make democracy more expensive than it already is or it would lead to 
national chaos (p.93). This view is similar to other views from Mill (1996) and others, who 
despite acknowledging the merits of participation think that modern populations and 
economies make participatory democracy virtually impossible.  
Contrary to the above perceptions, advocates of direct democracy consider widespread 
democratic participation possible. In the first case, citizens can actually take part in all 
major decisions in a state through perpetual referenda, contrary to claims made above. One 
way to achieve this is to remove parties or any mediating agents or advisory bodies and to 
let people discuss and decide on issues that affect them in the way they affect them (see 
Budge, 1994, p.23). Budge’s proposal for this way of conducting direct democracy is 
problematic despite its promotion of the equality of citizens and their capability to handle 
their own affairs. Critics dismiss this model because of its inherent capability to create 
social chaos.  
The most competitive and challenging form of republicanism is ‘Modern Republicanism’. 
This form teaches direct democracy where parties exist but they are only left with the role 
of mediation while the whole citizenry subjects legislative bills and other political 
decisions to popular vote (Budge, 1993, p.24). Budge’s (1993) reasoning is set against 
representation’s contestation that in many cases popular majorities are too weak and 
shifting to offer a basis for a permanent executive; that most of the citizens are unqualified, 
ill informed, apathetically orientated to engage in high policy matters and the everyday 
political decisions (p.27-28). While this may not be the case with all representative forms, 
it can still be maintained that representation usually disengages the majority, as the leaders 
are perceived to be properly running the affairs of the state. Budge holds, “…extension of 
 34
opportunities will itself change the political nature of many citizens from apathy and lack 
of interest, which produce withdrawal and ignorance, to involvement and interest, which 
produce more sophistication and information…” (p.33). Budge’s direct democracy implies 
that knowledge is not the preserve of experts. No barrier exists between groups of 
populations barring one from full political participation. As such, political ignorance is not 
static because people’s engagement in debate makes them more knowledgeable. 
Nevertheless, Budge’s conceptualisation of participatory democracy misses out on 
deliberation in preference for plebiscites. 
The limitations that critics of participatory democracy are worried about could, to a large 
extent, be answered by extending the participatory realm to include extensive deliberation 
of all people. Recent participatory notions of deliberative democracy (Benhabib, 1996) and 
communicative democracy (Young, 1996) suggest a way forward to a strong democratic 
citizenship. Benhabib (1996, pp.68-70) focuses on democracy as legitimate when all 
concerned people are capable of reaching reasonable decisions. In her view, decisions 
affecting the well-being of a group should be seen as the outcome of free and reasoned 
deliberation among equals, within principles of equality and symmetry for all to initiate 
speech, interrogate and debate (p.70). The agenda is that which is open to all and there are 
no prior rules guiding the conversation except those the deliberating members form. 
Benhabib’s framework can be used to defend deliberative democracy as a way of building 
a strong citizenship education. Her proposal accommodates a broader public across 
difference. This understanding is similar to Barber’s conception of ‘publicness’ where 
community is defined and conditioned by the people’s deliberations in refusal of a priori 
constructions (Barber, p.133). Teaching democratic citizenship, therefore, would involve 
instilling into the citizens an awareness and exercise of their power to collectively consider 
what is good for them, to reason and discuss as equal moral and political agents. Those 
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who enter into deliberation are all those likely to be affected by the very process and 
content of the deliberation.   
Young (1996) however extends this model to include forms of communication and how 
these influence the inputs and outcomes of the deliberative democratic culture. In her view, 
representative democracy is interest-based and aggregates preferences without allowing 
sufficient discursive interaction between the citizens. Aggregation in representative 
democracy does not really result in decisions reasonably acceptable to all members, except 
the majority. Young’s (1996) extension of the deliberative model to include norms of 
conversation requires an equal voice for all citizens to make proposals and criticize them in 
an attempt to draw conclusions on the basis of a better argument. By adding greeting, 
rhetoric and storytelling to critical argument, Young hopes to arrive at true democratic 
communication that does not only engage deliberation in forms that are assertive, 
confrontational and masculine (Young, 2000). The communicative forms of democracy are 
especially more relevant to African democracies and Malawi for that matter, because 
narration and greeting, among others, speak more to Africa’s daily patterns of traditional 
life, which have also been predominant in people’s ways of life for ages. 
Other than considering modes of communication that are impediments to democratic 
participation, Young (1990) is more sympathetic to representation as she reconsiders 
(substantive) group difference and how more space for participation can be created through 
the interactions of diverse groups.  In her view, the notions of substantive group 
representation endorse a politics of difference and reconfigure the meaning of equality to 
incorporate substantive equality. Group difference promotes a positive group self-
definition, which further emancipates the group’s value and specificity. This standpoint 
enables all people and groups to criticise prevailing norms and institutions from an 
egalitarian perspective (p.167). Young (1990) also argues that recognition of group 
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difference assures procedural fairness in setting the public agenda and hearing about its 
items. Secondly, it assures a voice for the oppressed as well as the privileged; all the needs 
and interests in the public are recognized in democratic deliberations. Thirdly, it 
encourages the expression of individual and group needs and interests in terms of an appeal 
to justice, thereby promoting just outcomes as it maximizes the social knowledge expressed 
in discussion. This further promotes practical wisdom (pp.185-187). Young’s 
understanding of the incorporation of group difference into the way democracy operates 
promises to thwart the perceived dominance of elites or powerful societal groups. In fact, 
the recognition, affirmation and celebration of group identities should also be understood 
as better promoted within liberal democratic values (Macedo, 2003, p.414) 
Nevertheless, such an affirmation for the group difference of groups that should be 
internally democratic, and the requirement for their permanent structural representation in 
democratic decision-making structures is not propaganda for representative democracy, as 
it might sound (see Young, 2000, p.45). She proposes a de-centred model of deliberative 
democracy where the democratic process will be given normative and rational meaning by 
a perpetual communication and not simply because of its identification with an institution 
or a set of institutions (p.46). In this process: 
…there is no final moment of decision, such that the democratic forum can itself 
come under review. The norm-guided communicative process of open and public 
democracy occurs across wide distances and over long times, with diverse social 
sectors speaking to one another across difference of perspective as well as space 
and time. (Young, 2000, p.46)  
Young’s view of communicative democracy and its recognition of difference provides 
more enabling conditions for the active participation of citizens in their diversity. While 
this view ensures collective empowerment, collective decision-making resulting from free 
 37
and equal deliberation and group veto power regarding specific policies that affect groups 
directly, it is also likely to teach citizens to recognize, acknowledge and tolerate group 
differences. As such, teaching citizenship according to communicative and deliberative 
models is more likely to open up a diverse array of political expressions and engagement 
between all concerned citizens in order for them to deliberate on all matters of concern 
until a right course agreeable to all concerned citizens is discovered. Hence, such forms are 
also better positioned to promote active democratic citizenship. 
The labours to cultivate and achieve a strong democratic citizenship as argued by Budge, 
Benhabib and Young demand more than just a clear conception of participatory and 
deliberative democracy. The pursuance and maintenance of any democratic culture has 
globally been marked against specific benchmarks. The most crucial of these benchmarks 
include the level and extent to which people’s freedoms and rights are promoted and 
protected. In the following chapter, we take a look at what it means to teach democratic 
citizenship amidst these benchmarks. We examine the concepts of freedom and human 
rights as we also probe into the forms of freedoms and human rights that are most likely to 
promote the democratic agenda at hand, the cultivation of strong democratic and 
deliberative citizenship. The chapter further explores the ramifications of particular 
conceptions of freedom and human rights for national development and the whole concept 
of development. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
FREEDOM AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION 
3.1 Introduction 
In the preceding chapter, we have mapped out competing conceptions of democracy. These 
conceptions are a foreground against which we can also understand notions of freedom and 
human rights. Notions of freedom and human rights have become contested in democratic 
theory, particularly with regard to how they help to promote or undermine participatory 
citizenships and the nature of the freedoms people enjoy. Conversely, the extent to which a 
society conceptualises and practices freedom and human rights is regarded as the litmus 
test for the extent to which such a society is seen as democratic and as promoting 
democratic citizenship. The level and extent of these freedoms and rights has a direct 
impact on the conception and practice of development. In this light, this chapter argues that 
not all conceptions of freedom and human` rights promote active citizenship. Formal and 
abstract notions of freedom and human rights are very likely to promote passive 
citizenship; whereas contestatory notions are likely to promote active citizenship. 
Some scholars have rated the goodness of democratic government against the proficiency 
of government in promoting the existing faculties of its members, such as the moral, 
intellectual and the active capacities. In this light, popular government is seen as that where 
a large number of the citizens in the nation have a stake and a say in the affairs of this 
government (Mill, 1996). Pettit (2002) consolidates this view by proposing: “the freedom 
of citizens can be furthered if steps are taken to curb state or public power over individuals 
and private power of interference by other agents” (p.152). Promoting capacities of 
members and curbing negative forces against the same faculties is understood as two sides 
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of the same thing. A government that promotes this sense of freedom is seen as good not 
just because people take part in the running of its affairs, but because such participation 
improves their own moral, intellectual and active faculties, and gives them an audible and 
powerful voice that enables them to articulate their common avowable interests, which in 
turn government needs to promote (Mill, 1996; Pettit, 2002, p.159). The people’s sense of 
freedom takes them out into social action for the sake of their society. Similarly, a 
government would be rated as bad in terms of how it deteriorates the same faculties and 
freedoms of people to articulate their interests. 
The above understanding gives governments one choice, i.e. to promote the welfare and 
interests of its citizens. These interests are secured when the interested persons participate 
in the protection and promotion of these interests. The process of actively securing one’s 
interests is also a mark of one’s freedom. Participation gives a sense of freedom that is 
central to political life for its dual emancipatory power. While participation is a way of 
liberating self, it is itself an act or exercise of freedom. 
The promotion of the interest of the citizens has not taken a homogeneous path. Much as 
competing conceptions of democratic theory have implied varied and competing 
conceptions of citizen participation; this has influenced how democratic freedom is 
conceived and promoted. This chapter considers that a proper understanding of the concept 
and use of freedom is indispensable to the discourse of education for democracy and 
democratic citizenship and the teaching of democratic freedom. For the purpose of the 
argument in this dissertation, freedom and autonomy will be taken as equivalent. 
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3.2 Competing conceptions of autonomy 
Freedom plays a crucial role in democratic theory. In the first place, freedom understood 
from representative perspectives has often led to notions of freedom as comprising the 
legal protection of individual rights; state or societal non-interference in individual projects 
of existence. Pogge (2002) describes this as a minimalist conception in the sense that it 
emphasises negative duties (p.64). The concentration on freedom as something that has to 
be protected in order for individuals simply to enjoy it ascribes to freedom general 
characterisations that are devoid of any social obligations and responsibilities and 
participation. This is contrary to maximalist expectations. The minimalist’s dominant 
forms of education for democratic citizenship concentrate on freedom as a citizen’s 
entitlement, to be provided for and protected by the state. Maximalist defenders think this 
approach largely misses out on freedom as empowerment towards social obligation 
because of the limited forms of citizen participation in civic affairs that are involved in it. 
In their regard, the maximalists acknowledge that human rights entail both negative duties 
and positive duties (Pogge, 2002). On the other hand, the maximalist agenda is also too 
extensive when it proposes, “… human rights require efforts to fulfil everyone’s human 
rights anywhere on earth …” (Pogge, ibid), thereby overstretching the freedom that 
accompanies social obligations.  
The ambiguity and diversity in the notion of freedom, as shown above, can be attributed to 
the complexity and dynamism inherent in the concept itself. Dworkin (1991) argues that 
our understanding of freedom depends on the nature of problems and questions that 
confront us at the time that we are trying to understand freedom (p.359). Freedom has been 
understood variously: as positive (entitlement), as negative (restraint) and even as neutral. 
For instance Berlin (1996) distinguishes between positive and negative liberty. He 
understands negative freedom as a condition whereby individuals can act without being 
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obstructed by others. Berlin argues that negative freedom only becomes so in the face of 
human interference and not natural capacity or incapacity. (p.90-91). Negative freedom 
arises from the belief that human beings can advance their goals only when they are left to 
pursue them without any other interference. Berlin also considers positive freedom as an 
internal drive to originate and live one’s wishes. According to him, positive freedom also 
involves the wish “to be conscious of oneself as a thinking, willing, active being bearing 
responsibility for one’s choices and able to explain them by reference to one’s own ideas 
and goals” (op. cit., p.94). On the other hand, Dworkin uses hypothetical consent in order 
to reconsider freedom as a person’s capacity to form, revise and rationally pursue what he 
or she sees as good (op. cit., p.361-362). 
Nevertheless, major debate on the concept of freedom surrounds the distinction between 
positive and negative freedom. The two concepts of liberty / freedom, although usually 
presented as opposed to each other, according to popular conception, operate on the basis 
of each other. For instance, if one were asked why one would not want others to influence 
or coerce one’s actions in any way, one loose answer would be that the person wants to 
determine him/herself. Similarly, the capacity and will to live one’s wishes would be in 
question if there were no influence from others. O’Neill (1992) exemplifies this conceptual 
interdependence through her examination of autonomy / freedom from a Kantian 
perspective. In this perspective, positive freedom is seen as ‘independence from alien 
causes’ (p.213). In other words, one cannot talk about positive freedom without some 
indication of the absence of external influences. Nevertheless, O’Neill’s (1992) evaluation 
of Kantian autonomy points to the idea that such a conception only acts as a capacity 
indicator of all rational beings and “..takes too little account of human bonds and 
solidarity…”, and the institutional and social settings that may affect our capacities (p.219). 
The interconnection between the positive and negative concepts of freedom means that 
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freedom is a relational concept. The two sides or perspectives operate to enhance each 
other.  
Because of the centrality of issues of freedom in public action and life democratic 
discourse on freedom takes different forms and shapes, depending on the dominant and 
competing perspective of democratic order available. Every conception of freedom has its 
presupposed political order and vice versa. The examination of liberal notions of autonomy 
and republican ideas of freedom has a lot of bearing with regard to re-conceptualising 
active citizenship in Malawi. I will argue that contestatory and republican forms of 
freedom and human rights, which are also related to deliberative and participatory forms of 
democracy, provide better chances of developing active citizenship than do liberal 
conceptions of these key concepts.  
 
3.2.1 Liberal conceptions of freedom and their limitations 
Liberal conceptions of freedom provide favourable ground for a minimalist conception of 
citizenship. The liberal conception of freedom, (hereafter also referred to as autonomy 
liberalism) is a framework that puts emphasis on individual freedoms and rights and 
proposes that individual persons have the capacity to decide what they want, including the 
type of life that each may choose to lead (Kymlicka, 2000; Burtonwood, 2003; Boyte, 
2003). This understanding of freedom evokes Berlin’s positive freedom (see Pettit, 1999). 
In this understanding, one owes duties to oneself primarily, and not to society. In return 
society has no mandate to intervene in the exercise of people’s personal autonomy and the 
making and implementation of their choices, except individuals’ recognition of each other 
as equals entitled to freedom (Waldron, 1998).  
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Autonomy liberalism in general puts a greater emphasis on the rights of individual 
members of society. Such emphasis allows members of society to decide on what they 
want to do and the type of life they want to lead in society. The rights of individuals are an 
entitlement and not some benefit arising from the good will of leaders.  Hence, when it 
comes to citizen –state or citizen –society relations, the state or society is not expected to 
interfere in the rightful possession and exercise of rights that individual members of the 
state or society claim to have, except when such possession harms or is likely to harm other 
people or the greater good in society. In other cases, state or societal interference in the 
possession and exercise of individual rights is allowed when such interference is meant to 
institute redress of rights not accorded to some members of state or society (Kymlicka, et. 
al.).  
The kind of citizen envisaged in autonomy liberalism is one who safeguards one’s own 
rights and is at liberty to exercise one’s rights, within the framework of freedom of thought. 
But such values of freedom of thought can also be fulfilled when one becomes critical of 
all surrounding authority. Autonomy liberalism is committed to individualism in the sense 
that in all social and political considerations, it is the individual person whose interests and 
considerations matter. Pogge (2002) thinks that negative freedom is promoted only as a 
way of driving at and protecting the individual freedoms people are supposed to have 
(p.64). The emphasis on the supremacy of individuality arises from a recognition of the 
capacity individual human beings have to direct their affairs and their capacity to recognize 
each other as equals in the same capacities (Waldron, 1998). As such freedom becomes a 
mark of their equality. Similarly, autonomy liberalism perceives political participation as 
valuable only when it enhances the individuals, otherwise requiring individual participation 
intrudes into individual freedoms. When individuals participate, they do so on their own 
liking and not that this participation is a social pre-requisite. Hence, it would be reasonable 
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to argue that autonomy liberalism is likely to promote limited forms of civic engagement 
just as minimalist virtues are suspicious of widespread civic involvement (McLaughlin, 
1992, p.236).  
Citizenship education that is framed in line with autonomy liberalism is likely to 
concentrate on the teaching of people’s rights and awareness of these democratic rights and 
entitlements. In other words, political knowledge of democratic principles and 
constitutional affairs and knowledge of individual rights become more valued than 
enabling citizens to acquire the skills and dispositions necessary for a democratic culture. 
In autonomy liberalism, citizenship becomes more a private issue than it is a public issue. 
In other words, citizens are seen as fulfilling their civic duties when they engage in the 
promotion and protection of the values that are central to individual human living rather 
than societal life as such. In particular, this understanding places greater emphasis on 
individual rights than on social and political obligations.  
 
3.2.2 Republican conceptions of freedom 
Whereas conceptions of freedom in autonomy liberalism have the tendency of promoting 
low civic engagement among citizens, republican conceptions of freedom enable 
participation and engagement from the citizens (Kymlicka, 2002). The republican notion of 
freedom is embedded in the ideal of active citizen participation. Nevertheless, republican 
freedom varies in emphasis, between the Aristotelian republicans and the modern 
republicans. Aristotelian republicanism advocates participation as the goal and end of all 
political involvement while modern republicanism regards participation as important for 
the cultivation of civic virtues. 
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Pettit (1999 and 2002) thinks that republican freedom comes into effect when individuals 
are not interfered with in relation to what they want to realize in their life; and that these 
individuals are also in a state of non-domination. This understanding of freedom relates to 
the condition that empowers people in their assertion of their perceived interests. Without 
over-stretching the two sides of freedom as dichotomous, it is possible for different 
perspectives to consider freedom largely from a negative perspective, in terms of being free 
from, while others concentrate on the positive perspective in terms of being free to. Pettit 
(1999) thinks that certain forms of freedom can be inimical to democratic freedom and 
education for democracy itself. He argues that it is difficult to defend a conception of 
positive or negative liberty from a simplistic point of view. In other words, the conception 
of freedom as freedom from and freedom to something is a narrow understanding of 
freedom within democratic discourse.  
Pettit argues that a consideration of freedom as negative liberty or as positive liberty does 
not necessarily lead to the conclusion that issues of individual liberty are necessarily issues 
of or in democracy. Discourse on the concepts and applicability of the notions of negative 
freedom and positive freedom can apply to any system or way of life apart from the 
democratic way of life (Pettit, 1999, p.168). The two concepts of liberty, although they 
provide a break through to understanding issues surrounding human freedom, do not, on 
their own, provide a stable basis for understanding democratic freedom. Using Berlin’s 
notion of the two concepts of liberty, Pettit further argues that negative freedom is 
problematic in the sense that it presupposes absence of coercive government law to the 
extent that government itself cannot coercively reform its own law in line with some 
democratic principles. Nevertheless, he thinks that it is possible to have legislation that is 
friendly to people’s freedom when such laws represent what the people want and that this 
is also a reflection of their interests. Pettit actually gives room for legislation that may be 
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coercive in the democratic framework. In other words legislation has a chance to be people 
friendly when it promotes the perceived interests of the people and in so far as it does not 
violate or compromise that same liberty it purports to defend and promote (Pettit, 1999, 
p.171). Pettit (2002) later suggests: “…democratic institutions must have a positive-and-
identity dimension, and a negative scrutiny-and-disallow dimension…” (p.159). This 
thinking arises from the belief that in a democracy citizens need to have an audible and 
powerful voice through which they search and uphold their avowed interests in life. The 
same voice should enable the citizens to scrutinise government policy and disallow those 
policies that are seen not to promote their avowed interests. 
This notion of freedom has a social dimension in the sense that aspects of non-interference 
and non-domination put one in the context of relation with other people. The recognition of 
the social condition that can exist between people and their environment makes republican 
freedom contestatory (Pettit, 1999). Such an approach would insist on teaching citizens an 
overlapping set of virtues from an overlapping set of institutions (Kymlicka. p.310). This 
approach would eventually enable parliamentary democracy to become more deliberative 
than being aggregational on party lines. The contestatory forms would in turn require all 
government decisions to become open to public inspection and reason (Pettit, p.193). 
Contestatory forms of republican freedom are more conducive to the cultivation of active 
citizens than liberal conceptions by allowing citizens to realize their avowable interests. 
The republican notion of freedom that conceives freedom as ‘non-domination and non-
interference’ (Van Parjis, p. 191), is nevertheless not conducive to the education of 
democratic active citizens. Van Parjis thinks that the idea of non-domination and non-
interference falls short of stipulating itself in an affirmative sense. Similarly, our 
conception of social responsibilities and obligations, which are central to the conception 
and operation of a project for democratic citizenship and education for participatory 
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citizenship, would not easily be drawn from such negative conceptions of freedom. This 
thinking also holds that it is on the basis of some positive notions that we can build 
appropriate conceptions of autonomy (Smith, 1997). The making of personal choices goes 
hand in hand with circumstances that oblige individuals or groups to make such options 
(see also Wringe, 1997, p.123). It is a freedom that is lived and negotiated through people’s 
social ‘environing’. Similarly, Smith (1997) quoting Benhabib (1992, p.81) defends a sense 
of autonomy that gives people “…a say in the economic, political and civic arrangements, 
which define their lives together…” (p.136). 
Is democratic freedom ‘non-domination’, ‘contestatory’, or really a third sense of the 
notion of freedom? Re-reading Berlin’s (1996) account of positive freedom shows that 
what Pettit and others would prefer to call a third sense is not that different from positive 
freedom itself. The latter are worried that positive freedom as explained by Berlin does not 
take into full consideration the self-determination and self-mastery required of a positive 
notion of freedom. Most of them think that such a concept does not completely bring out 
the sense of freedom as absence of domination. It is as if the two concepts of liberty in 
Berlin are in a disjuncture, and that positive freedom itself leaves the way too open for 
totalitarianism! Nevertheless, my impression is that Berlin’s notion of positive freedom can 
be read beyond what it apparently appears to be, to include self-mastery as well as a 
recognition that freedom cannot be achieved if one is being prevented from choosing what 
one desires by other people (Berlin, p. 94-95).  
From the preceding, positive freedom is both self-masterly and non-domination. The 
emphasis on non-domination does not only mean that people be considered severally or 
distributively but also that ‘the politically avowable and perceived interests’ of the minority 
groups be accorded similar recognition and treatment (Pettit, 1999, p.178; 2002, pp157-
160). The architects of the classical liberal tradition cannot agree to the later interpretation 
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of the notion of freedom as part of their own. In a way, the third sense of freedom in 
Pettit’s two discussions, or Kymlicka’s call for redress of the rights of minority groups, as 
some of the central notions of the concept of freedom, belong more to the republican 
tradition than the liberal autonomy tradition. 
The central notions in republican freedom are essentially both participatory and 
deliberative. The idea of freedom as non-domination and non-interference means that in the 
democratic process all people have a capacity to initiate and participate in any of their 
discussions. No single person or group holds a privileged position in relation to the other. 
As such, issues of discussion and the manner in which these things are discussed are 
matters of public agreement at the moment of discourse. Hence Pettit argues: 
“…contestatory democracy empowers people in the assertion of their perceived 
interests…” (p.193). An education system that encourages public deliberation and 
reasonableness is crucial to the cultivation of republican notions of freedom. This 
understanding makes democracy a government by contestation by all members of society. 
Hence democracy intrinsically becomes “freedom-friendly” (ibid). 
The notion and exercise of republican freedom embraces what Kymlicka (2002) calls 
civility. But, acknowledging the need for the cultivation of civility and actual practice of 
civility are two different but interdependent things. While it is not in the main interest of 
this dissertation to explain and justify how republican freedom can in practice be promoted, 
it is important that we outline what such a project would look like. Kymlicka (2002, pp 302 
-312) in his discussion of “the seedbeds of civic virtue” comes to conclude that such a 
virtue can be inculcated through the market place, civic associations, and the family among 
others (p.304). Nevertheless, Kymlicka argues that no single institution would bear upon 
itself as the sole vehicle for the teaching of republican freedom. The interplay of all 
institutions in society brings about civic freedom (ibid). 
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 3.2.3  Cultivating freedom for active citizenship 
Participatory models of democracy, while cherishing the need for the fundamentals around 
freedom such as legal enforcement, proceed to concentrate on issues of civic responsibility 
and obligation for the realisation and promotion of freedom as part of the exercise of one’s 
freedom. Such realisations are more possible where the participation in question is 
accompanied with republican notions of freedom. In this perspective, freedom does not 
become so much of an entitlement or a state provision that has to be jealously guarded, as it 
becomes an act of social engagement in the affairs of society. Freedom becomes a virtue 
that has to be socially cultivated. Sandel’s (1996) conception of republican freedom 
becomes authoritative in this regard. According to him, republican freedom is crucial for 
active participation because other than sharing in self-government, it also means,  
“…deliberating with fellow citizens about the common good and helping to shape the 
destiny of the political economy…” (p.5). This type of civic engagement also requires “…a 
concern for the whole, a moral bond with the community whose fate is at stake…” (ibid). 
Such a positioning of the shared sense of freedom requires civic virtues and values that can 
better sustain self-government.  
The above discussion has tried to bring out an age-old confrontation and tension between a 
formal realization of freedoms on the one hand, and substantive realization of the same 
(Bell, 1993, pp.2-3). Such a debate is situated within the reformulation of the liberal theory 
between the classical theorists such as Mill and its critics such as Rawls, and recently of 
Pettit. The debate also alludes to the idea that it is one thing to have formal recognition of 
the rights, freedoms and entitlements; and it is quite another thing to demand that these 
rights, freedoms and entitlements be realized in actual life (Pogge, 2002, p.62). This 
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position leads to substantive realization of these values in people’s lives. Contestatory and 
participatory forms of freedom accommodate basic freedoms in so far as their background 
enables individuals to exercise their powers of self-determination, which is “…the power to 
shape, pursue and revise life-plans…” (Bell, ibid). Along similar lines, Pettit (2002) quotes 
Sen (1978) and Nussbaum (1992) in their affirmation that citizens’ freedom as non-
domination can be achieved if each person “…enjoys a robust capability of functioning in 
one’s local society…” (Pettit, 2002, p.152). The local functionings that people have to 
access include the functioning to enable them to acquire food, shelter, medical care, 
education, information and cultural network, to work and mobility and many others (ibid). 
Such a substantive set of freedoms is most likely to promote active citizenship (see also 
Sen, 1999). 
  
3.3 Human rights approaches in citizenship education 
Human rights, freedom and democracy are intertwined concepts. One cannot talk of a 
meaningful democratic process without consideration of how human rights are promoted in 
the system. As such, this section argues that certain ways of understanding and 
implementing human rights are conducive to the development of active citizenship while 
others are likely to promote passive citizenship. In a number of democratisation processes, 
such as in South Africa and in Malawi, the emphasis on a culture of human rights has been 
a major indicator of the democratic process. The preceding section alludes to the idea that 
an assessment of human rights cannot be made without recourse to the freedoms and extent 
of the freedoms people enjoy. To a large extent, processes and systems have been regarded 
as democratic depending on the level of respect for human rights that the specific society 
has. The fact that human rights and human rights approaches have become indispensable 
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for democratic processes moves us to yet another complex set of issues. If democracy itself 
is not one neat set of principles readily available for application and if approaches to 
questions of human freedom are similarly complex depending on the type of emphasis one 
puts on them, then it would be erroneous if human rights and human rights approaches 
were not considered as diverse within democratic discourse.  
Carrim (2000), for example, thinks that there are different ways of understanding human 
rights, which affect the way these rights are framed and promoted. We argue here that the 
conceptualisation, framing and practice of human rights further determine how democratic 
citizenship develops. Carrim (2000) understands this process to lead to three different 
conceptions of human rights. These three are the legalistic understanding, the integration of 
human rights, democracy and citizenship in courses, and the framing that focuses on 
controversial issues, debates etc. (Carrim, p.34). In other words, within democratic 
discourse and education for democratic citizenship, not all human rights talk would be 
homogeneous. Carrim (2000) thinks that understanding the constitutionality of rights is 
different from teaching rights in a classroom just as all this is different from looking at 
rights as controversial issues! 
The above categorisation involves some problematic issues that need clarification. While it 
may arguably be stated that the nature of human rights and democracy are so complex that 
there are bound to be different perspectives on the ways in which these would lead to 
effective citizenship education; one needs to note, in any case, that the incorporation of 
citizenship education is not per se a way of framing human rights as Carrim presents it. 
The way we understand conceptual issues surrounding human rights and the forms that we 
eventually make human rights to have are one thing. Transmitting this body of knowledge 
so that it becomes effective is another thing. The former only deals with methodological 
issues while the latter has the substantive issues at heart. On the substantive level, it can 
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still be maintained using his argument that human rights can be conceptualised as legal 
instruments in terms of simply being informative pieces as he later comes to explain them, 
which I agree with. On the same level, it is also possible to understand human rights and 
democracy as essentially about controversial issues and debates involving dilemmas, 
tensions and contradictions.  
The consideration of tensions, controversies and dilemmas in teaching human rights is 
dependent on one’s understanding of the general framework of how human rights and 
democracy are supposed to be understood and to operate. The second approach, as it were, 
goes further towards a consideration of controversies, tensions or contradictions. Such a 
consideration can also be understood as resting on formal conceptions of human rights. But 
in many cases, and such is my assumption, a proper focus on controversial issues and 
debates retains more of its meaning or becomes really controversial in cases where the 
body of knowledge is confronted with issues of practice as opposed to issues that are 
merely theoretical. Hence, implicit in the second way of understanding human rights is the 
idea of framing human rights, democracy and citizenship education with a bearing on how 
they would appear in people’s actual practices. The second way of understanding human 
rights certainly relies on a good understanding of the forms of human rights. But this 
approach goes beyond mere formalism to consideration of how actual life practices and 
experiences should shape human rights discourse in democratic citizenship and its 
education. 
Pogge (2002), on the other hand, presents three ways of understanding human rights. On 
the one hand, the minimalists maintain that human rights duties are exclusively negative. 
This position promotes restraint and holds that human rights only require self-restraint 
from harming others. On the other hand, Pogge believes that the maximalist views human 
rights as entailing both negative and positive duty to the extent that human rights duties call 
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for people’s “…efforts to fulfil everyone’s human right anywhere on earth…” (Pogge, 
p.64). Contrary to the two views, Pogge proposes a conception of human rights that entails 
moral duties within one’s social system, a middle-ground between the maximalist and the 
minimalist (p.66). According to Pogge (2002), serious problems concerning human rights 
conceptions centre on the difference between moral rights and legal rights. Moral rights 
refer to those that go beyond space and time in the sense of not being dependent on 
particular systems in societies. They form a ground from which universal humanity owes 
its claim to rights. Legal rights are made to effect the moral rights but remain bound within 
particular societies or governments in the sense that they represent what such societies have 
agreed to be binding (Pogge, 2002, p.59). 
What this dissertation refers to as a legalistic understanding of human rights, democracy 
and citizenship education, is a pre-occupation with constitutional issues, bills of rights, 
legislation, voter education, the definition and functions of parliament and its members (see 
also Carrim, ibid). Although such an approach provides the basic content of the 
requirement for democratic citizenship, the approach is not proactive in terms of its 
capacity to directly encourage participation by the citizens in public affairs. Essentially, the 
approach accommodates imparting knowledge of these institutions as its democratic 
mandate. It can further be implied that knowledge of these democratic systems or exposure 
to what is contained in the constitution and other legal instruments presupposes promotion 
of democracy (Carrim, p. 35). The legalistic approach sharply goes against the position that 
“…the enduring respect of human rights is sustained not just by the country’s constitution, 
its legal and political system, and the attitudes of its politicians, judges and police; and that 
it can only be sustained more deeply by the attitudes of its people, and shaped by the 
education system …” (Pogge, p.63) 
 54
The basic exposure to human rights, democracy and citizenship education is necessary only 
in so far as it provides a ground for transforming into a democratic system. While concepts 
of ‘citizenship’, ‘state’ and ‘rights’ gain their meanings from a legalistic grounding, 
treating human rights from such a stance makes human rights to embrace formal and 
universalistic patterns. In this way, the individuality and uniqueness of citizens suffer in an 
attempt to bring sameness across fundamentally different categories that require special 
attention for justice to be achieved (Carrim, p.36). Such universal approaches “…only 
equip people with general and macro understandings of concepts…” and as such are not 
substantial enough and specific to people’s lives (op. cit). These legalistic approaches 
cannot meaningfully be translated to practice and as such they are likely to minimize 
people’s experiences.  
Pogge (2002) holds that a vigilant citizenry that is deeply committed to human rights and 
disposed to work for its political realization is the major way of securing human rights 
(p.62). In fact, “ …the legalistic and universalistic tendencies do not necessarily lead to 
actual democratic practices and behaviour, due to their lack of engagement with what they 
would mean in particular cases with specific people in actual circumstances…” (Carrim, 
2000, p.36). In other words we cannot rely on human rights discourse that is characterised 
by formal and universal pictures of humanity to cultivate democratic citizenship, let alone 
use it to cultivate people’s strong engagement in civic affairs! The major contention here is 
not that legal rights are useless, for without them our moral rights would never be realised 
in our particular historical moments. The consolidation of moral rights is commonly 
regarded as depending on their legal enforceability (as noted by Enslin & Pendlebury, 
2000, pp. 434-435). What makes matters different is that citizens do not sit waiting for 
government to give them these rights, but that citizens persistently demand of government 
these rights without relegating them to archived matters of the constitution (Pogge, 2002).  
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The moral consideration of human rights becomes crucial for democratic citizenship 
because it enhances the capacity of individual persons to “…develop a sense of self-worth 
and equal recognition of the worth of others…” (Enslin & Pendlebury, p.437). Both moral 
and legal rights need to be promoted and maintained for a culture of human rights and 
democracy. As such, a system of democratic citizenship acquires its legitimacy in relation 
to how well it maintains the legal framework within its social environment (op.cit., p.435). 
The moral dimension of rights leads one to consider other people not merely as equals 
before the law but also as equal persons in all dimensions of human life. It is to this extent 
that the moral consideration of rights acquires a virtuous dimension.    
The consideration of both legal rights and moral rights in any framework and 
implementation of human rights has several merits. The approach promotes the permeation 
of human rights in all aspects of people’s lives. To this extent the approach to human rights 
and democracy is better equipped to break the wall between the public and the private and 
bring in effective promotion and protection of human rights. It has also been argued that a 
consideration of moral rights in the private and domestic domain is a crucial factor for the 
recognition of rights in the public and civic spheres of life (op. cit., p.437). Although legal 
rights are important in the whole framework of democratic citizenship it is important to 
note that legalistic and universalistic tendencies will not necessarily lead to the building of 
democratic practices (Carrim, p.36) and that legal rights and civic rights alone are 
insufficient for the promotion of a culture of human rights (Enslin & Pendlebury, p.437). 
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3.4 Cultivating an active democratic citizen engagement through republican 
notions of freedom and human rights: a concluding comment 
This discussion has highlighted that freedom and human rights can be perceived and 
promoted from different perspectives. Not all perspectives on freedom and human rights 
would promote active citizenship to the same extent. As such, the chapter argues that 
republican and contestatory forms of freedom, and approaches to human rights that on the 
one hand recognise that human rights issues are controversial and allow citizens to 
consistently make claims of their governments are more likely to promote active 
citizenship. Liberty requires a sense of community and civic engagement (Sandel, 1996), 
which can better be realised through the various complex circumstances and dilemmas that 
confront actual life circumstances. The emphasis on the dynamic side of human rights and 
freedom does not ultimately do away with the formal and abstract conceptions, neither is it 
a suggestion that we do not need the minimal and maximal sides in considering human 
rights and republican forms of freedom. In many cases, the formal and abstract conceptions 
are a foundation for the realisation of active democratic citizenship. In other words, 
although practice that considers the engagement of citizens is important, there is need for a 
certain threshold of understanding on human rights issues, which is indispensable for any 
application of the same. Yet we argue that approaches in human rights conceptions should 
not be primarily based on the mere fundamentals because such approaches disable citizens 
from transcending the frameworks in which they are wrapped.  
This dissertation proposes that for the sake of developing active citizens that are concerned 
with all aspects of their lives, republican forms of freedom need to be taught, developed 
and nurtured. Republican forms of freedom have a broader perspective of the public and 
the demands of the public than are liberal conceptions. In the broader framework of 
freedom, freedom is discovered in the citizen contestation over how their life should be 
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managed. Teaching citizens freedom essentially denotes teaching them self-mastery and 
self-determination, other than merely ensuring that their rights are not violated or that 
accorded to them by some agent elsewhere.  
In the following chapter, the importance of republican notions of freedom and human 
rights is highlighted through the interconnections that exist between development and 
freedom. Much as conceptions of democracy find their definitive meanings in the way 
human rights and freedoms are lived, there is a serious link between the conception of 
these rights and freedoms with the way development becomes associated with citizen 
engagement. The following chapter takes as its starting point the realisation of a 
dichotomous approach to conceptions of development and democracy that one commonly 
finds in Africa. It seeks to unveil its probable origins while indicating its dangers to 
democratic citizenship education. The chapter proposes the conception of ‘freedom as 
development’ as a way forward.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
DEVELOPMENT AND DEMOCRACY IN CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION 
4.1 Introduction 
In our previous chapter, we have considered competing conceptions of freedom and human 
rights and their bearing on particular forms of citizenship and citizenship education. This 
chapter takes the discussion further by considering how conceptions of citizenship 
emanating from such competing forms further influence the way people conceptualise and 
engage in development work placed within the mandate of their democratic citizenship. 
The chapter analyses how the discourse on development and democracy construct notions 
of citizenship and citizenship education. In relation to the notions of participatory forms of 
democracy and republican and contestatory forms of human rights and freedom that have 
been discussed above, particular attention will be paid to examining the extent to which 
competing conceptions of the relationship between development and democracy are more 
likely to promote active citizenship.  
The mapping of our task in this chapter is dogged with a number of dilemmas. The 
relationship between democracy and development is certainly not an easy one to construct. 
This is because both concepts have never had single referents in their own usages. But 
despite this fact, the opening chapters of this dissertation have argued for a particular 
conception of democracy that is participatory and whose freedoms are republican, for 
instance. Having argued for such options, the current chapter seeks to bring out 
complimentary conceptions of development. This task brings us to our second dilemma. 
Should development and democracy be linked? Or does our theorization bring a false 
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marriage between the two? I suggest that we sort out this dilemma by reconsidering the 
meaning of development. Ake (1996) reconstructs the meaning of development as: 
A process by which people create and recreate themselves and their life 
circumstances to realize higher levels of civilization in accordance with their own 
choices and values (p.125). 
Ake’s conception places development and democracy intractably together. This conception 
of development places importance on people’s choices and their agency in the processes of 
their development. Such an understanding is later refreshed by Sen (1999) who sees 
development as the expansion of the freedoms people enjoy. The model is congruent with 
participatory democracy, republican and contestatory forms of freedom. It also shifts our 
understanding of development from an infrastructural and technological perspective to a 
holistic concept of development as expanding the freedoms that we enjoy through the 
expansion of our capabilities. This chapter opts for and discusses these conceptions later.  
In the following sections, we survey the dichotomy I argue has been created between 
development and democracy, which has caused much scepticism about the way the two are 
linked. Apart from Ake’s re-conceptualisation of the link between development and 
democracy in Africa, there has not been much definitive exposition of the delicate links 
between the two. In many cases there are assumptions that the two are simply closely 
related to each other or that development is an instrument of democracy (Cloete, 1994, 
p.53). In other words, the idea that development and democracy are aspects of each other 
still remains unexplored. This also mainly refers to how such a relationship affects 
democratic citizenship discourse and education. In taking to task this apparent gap, the 
chapter examines the dichotomy that exists in the treatment of development and democracy 
in Africa, and argues that this works to the disadvantage for a conception for active 
democratic citizenship and its education. The chapter attempts to understand this 
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dichotomy by examining the onset of democratic politics in Africa and the conception of 
citizenship implied in the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD).  
While acknowledging that to a lot of people development means economic growth and is 
associated with development projects, this dissertation opts to understand development 
from positions espoused by Claude Ake (1996) and Amartya Sen (1999) where a holistic 
approach is favoured. This understanding is better positioned to consolidate the proposal 
for the education of an active participatory citizenship.  
 
4.2 Democracy and development: a dichotomy?  
The relationship between development and democracy has, in many cases, been assumed 
as obvious, although such an assumption does not resolve the entailed problems and 
dilemmas. Little has been written on the conceptual links between the two. In some cases, 
attempts to link the two have mostly ended up in affirming their consequential relationship. 
This tendency has not received widespread scrutiny. The assumed consequential 
relationship of development to democracy and the other way round has led some people to 
further think that democracy works in the west because the west is developed and that the 
same cannot be the case in Africa because of Africa’s rampant poverty, famines and wars 
that have torn peoples and societies apart. This assumption demands our attention. Below, 
we examine the possible sources of this apparent dichotomous thinking.  
Claude Ake (1996) provides us with one of the probable historical accounts of this 
dichotomy. He suggests that the interplay between politics and development should be 
understood through an examination of its development from the colonial periods to the first 
independent African states. He argues that the struggle for political power at independence 
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suffocated the efforts to development because the need for development was politically 
manipulated to wield power (p.7). Consequent to this, the colonial master was expected to 
consolidate development programmes, while the African leadership continued to talk about 
development only as tool for maintaining its power base within the wishes of the people 
and not for the sake of development itself. The ambition to amass political power was 
made successful through a clear distinction between politics and development. 
“…The African leadership proclaimed the need for development and made development 
the new ideology without necessarily translating it into a programme of societal 
transformation. The struggle for power and survival crowded their vision of 
development…” (Ake, 1996, op. cit., p.9). At war with each other at this stage was the 
obvious realisation that Africa’s politics, economics and social life needed to be improved 
whilst requiring citizen obedience and conformity at the same time. Consequently, the wish 
to separate development from politics created problems in conceiving what would be the 
clearly manifested objectives and goals of development and the other potential political 
agendas that development would be used for.  
From this early stage, one notes a tendency in Africa to see development programmes as 
apolitical. This has also resulted in political hegemony and an active suffocation of 
opposition politics or dissent in the name of national development, for instance in Malawi’s 
first independent government. I argue later that Malawi shows these features even after its 
re-introduction of multi-party politics; the development agenda has consistently acquired 
apolitical characteristics. From this understanding, one could conclude that development 
and democracy are not parallel processes; that in Africa development should precede 
democracy; and that democracy in Africa would be meaningless without economic 
development. This understanding assumes development and politics to be autonomously 
separated processes.  
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The above view is backed up by a number of scholars on Africa who contend that 
democracy is simply a particular stage in the development of a nation, and that it is only 
after attaining a specific stage of development that a nation can begin to talk about the 
implementation of democracy (Mugyenyi, 1988). This argument conceives of development 
as a process of increasing the capacity to cope with internal and external demands (op. cit., 
p.178). The concepts of ‘capacity’ and ‘demand’ are not clarified, but one can deduce that 
the reference goes to how well people can manage to cope with both internal and external 
economic demands and other demands to do with technological know-how. The concept in 
use assumes that development has to be related with something that is very tangible and 
uniquely observable. This argument is closely related to the historical argument analysed 
above.  
A resource argument is also used to defend the dichotomy. It states that the resources to 
manage a democracy in Africa are missing (Mugyenyi and others, 1988). In this argument 
observation is made that Africa’s economy is not one that can sustain democracy and its 
thorough implementation. This thinking is close to the ‘Lee thesis’ which defends the 
denial of political liberty and basic civil rights as a condition for the stimulation of 
economic growth (Sen, 1999, p. 15). Hence the question of resources does not have much 
to do with the availability of the citizens, but economic and infrastructural resources. This 
argument inevitably excludes notions of democratic agency and the freedoms people have 
in order for them to pursue their own development. People become means for development. 
Similarly low capacity, which is a mark of under-development, is understood to mean low 
prospects for democracy. Certain levels of communication and managerial infrastructure, 
such as trained personnel, become a mark of development and a precondition for a 
democracy (Mugyenyi, M., p.181). That the west did not begin with democracy is also 
used as an additional reason for the argument!  
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The above arguments claim that sustainable development only requires a sufficient sum of 
supportive persons to keep the system steadily going, and not the majority will. In other 
words, democracy in the spirit of open and continuous deliberation becomes an antithesis 
to development. The proponents of the separation also argue that the systems that have led 
to development have depended on effective law and order, government provision of basic 
resources, which in turn wins people’s confidence. The underlying assumption here is 
minimalist. It assumes that once the conditions for sustainable development have been put 
in place and are stable, only then can a nation take seriously its democratisation agenda 
(Mugyenyi, 1988, p.185; see also Wanjohi, 1998). 
The minimalist path described above is also recommended for Africa, according to 
Mugyenyi (1988) and others, because of multiple factors. In the first place, Africa’s low 
capacity in both human resources and her low economic development create the low 
prospects for Africa’s democracy. Hence, economic and human resource development 
precedes anything else. For instance: “…rural electrification and access to roads should 
take priority over expanding the participation of the rural folk…” (op. cit., p.182). Using 
studies of the experiences of Kenya and Tanzania under Nyerere and Kenyetta 
respectively, Mugyenyi argues, “…in Africa the adoption of development strategy 
precedes and supersedes the adoption and promotion of democracy…” (ibid). The 
simultaneous realization of both is seen as an impossible path for Africa (Wanjohi, 1988, 
p.207). There is a growing feeling among these scholars that where democracy has 
preceded economic development, the short-term effects of development have been 
suffocated until a well-founded and secure economic system has been laid down. In such 
cases, the pace of economic accumulation has tended to slow down. Nevertheless no 
engagement with cases with simultaneous processes is made. 
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The third argument in defence of the dichotomy states: “…qualities that determine 
electability are not always relevant to the performance of the development roles. 
Electability is not the same as capability in handling public policy and management…” 
(Mugyenyi, p.186). The argument does away with democratic government, let alone 
democratic participation as a way of managing development in Africa (see also Oyugi, 
p.46). Similarly citizens would need to know and be taught how to develop themselves 
economically and technologically instead of teaching them to participate in politics. Echoes 
of this have also come from some of Africa’s second democracies’ presidents like that of 
Malawi who is popularly known for the view that we should leave politics aside when it 
comes to development; that people do not eat democracy, but eat maize and other foods.  
The above dichotomous conceptions impact negatively on democratic citizenship and 
education. The conceptions are comfortable with a democracy of the leaders and not of the 
people. Citizenship education takes the citizens as recipients of civic programmes and not 
their framers. In fact representative democracy is also considered as a synonym for all 
democracy. According to Mugyenyi (1988) the masses cannot be entrusted to choose a 
leader who will steer a nation in development because political effectiveness does not mean 
that the same could be true if the person were also to lead in the development of the people. 
Secondly, the idea of national development is heavily linked with technocracy and not 
necessarily mass participation or citizen empowerment in the hatching of development 
ideas and their implementation. Hence development belongs to individual leaders and not 
the people. These conceptions present serious problems for the conceptualisation of active 
democratic citizenship. 
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4.2.1 Re-conceptualizing the development and democracy link: NEPAD’s 
continued dichotomy 
The problematic relationship between development and democracy resurfaces in the New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). NEPAD is one of the current 
programmes that calls for Africa’s renewed and collective commitment to social, economic 
and political development. It is viewed as “…a vision and strategic framework for Africa’s 
renewal…” and was “…adopted at the 37th and last summit of the Organization of African 
Unity (OAU) in July 2001, as the socio-economic development programme of the African 
Union (AU)…” (NEPAD in Brief, www.nepad.org/2005/files/inbrief.php, accessed on 
19/3/2005). NEPAD is also regarded to originate from “…the common vision, firm and 
shared conviction of African leaders in their sense of duty to eradicate poverty…” (South 
Africa - Department of Foreign Affairs, 2001, p.1). Many commentators agree that in its 
mission, NEPAD is a development agenda for Africa, prioritising sustainable development 
in the areas of economic development, social development and environmental protection 
(see also NEPAD Articles 9 – 17). This section intends to show that while NEPAD makes 
a number of strides in re-conceptualising the link between development and democracy, it 
does not go far enough in providing a conception for active democratic citizenship and the 
education for that citizenship. We focus first on what the official NEPAD constitutive act 
says before we consider critical views of it. 
On the whole the NEPAD shows positive signs of heading towards the development of 
active citizenship. The first of these is the priority that is given to matters of African 
urgency; that Africans will not be determined by outside circumstances apart from the 
conditioning of their own circumstances (Articles 7, 54-56). Together with this, the 
document acknowledges that development is a process of empowerment and self-reliance 
(Article 27); which gives the impression that development is a process and a shift from 
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being dictated upon to self-affirmation, thereby also implying emancipatory freedom. This 
notion of development accommodates citizens’ involvement for the improvement of their 
capabilities. 
Furthermore democracy and state legitimacy have been redefined to place as its central 
elements accountable government, a culture of human rights and popular participation 
(Article 43). This acts as a basis for the responsibility of African leaders (Article 49). 
Article 79 soberly acknowledges, “…development is impossible in the absence of 
democracy…” (NEPAD, p.31). People’s participation has been evoked in a number of 
places as a pre-condition for the success of the system (see also Articles: 71, 83, and 106) 
and as part of Africa’s duty to eradicate poverty and head towards sustainable 
development. The role of women also receives marked emphasis. 
Nevertheless, NEPAD trades off this agenda and risks creating passive citizens in its 
pursuit of a development agenda that does not arise from below, thereby perpetuating the 
dichotomy between development and democracy. In the first place, the stated reasons for 
the introduction of NEPAD seem to be the development of a new relationship with other 
continents especially the highly industrialized (Article 8), otherwise also stated as a re-
definition of Africa’s relationship with the western world. Thus, industrialization and 
globalisation become core issues in Africa’s re-definition of development. This is re-
enforced by the idea that the imperative of development is not only a moral requirement 
but it is fundamental to the sustainability of the globalisation process (Article 39); and that 
NEPAD’s main objective is “…to bridge gaps in development so that Africa catches up 
with developed parts of the world…” (Article 65). In other words, NEPAD’s pro-western 
model of industrialization and civilization jeopardises its own mission to determine its 
development agenda. 
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The nature and scope of development emanating from these sections is limited despite its 
extension to other aspects of human existence such as the social, cultural and political 
factors (Article 49). The regional and sub-regional approaches to development in NEPAD 
(93-98) cover such sectors as markets, economic integration, disease and poverty 
eradication (Articles 38, 67) and environmental protection among others. The development 
of civic virtues is grossly missing. 
One other dominant position within NEPAD’s development philosophy is the idea that 
Africa needs a development paradigm that is developed by Africans for African problems, 
and that Africa will work this out by herself. Article 52 affirms this understanding by 
emphasizing that there is a need to “…harness and utilize Africa’s natural and human 
resources in order to lead to equitable and sustainable growth of the continent and its 
integration into the world economy…” This article represents a growing consensus within 
Africa against donor dictated development agendas to movement towards indigenous ideas 
for the development of Africa, the need to be self-defined. Despite the general umbrella 
under which Africans are assumed to be determining their circumstances, the model is very 
economic and technological in character. In other words, NEPAD tries to provide Africa 
with an economic renaissance that falls short of holistic development. In this kind of 
approach, the idea that development precedes democracy becomes justifiable. 
NEPAD’s development Goals (Article 68) and expected outcomes (Article 69) move from 
issues of growth in GNP to Gender equality and market integration among others. 
Although there is also recognition of democracy, good governance and human rights, and 
sound economic management as conditions for sustainable development, these factors are 
not the primary goals nor are they the expected outcomes of NEPAD. NEPAD’s goals and 
strategies (67–70) have nothing particularly democratic in them except that they can be 
better achieved in a democratic environment (Articles 79, 81,83). Democracy and 
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democratic citizenship (including human rights, rule of law, peace and good governance) 
are peripheral and only stand as facilitators to development. In other words, the need for 
the cultivation of democratic citizenship becomes extrinsic.  
From other perspectives, NEPAD is wanting in its development concept. It is seen as 
techno-economic, exotic and that its project-approach to development limits its own 
conception of development (Nyuylime, LP, 2004). The project-approach to development 
limits the concept to economic and infrastructural matters at the expense of people’s 
emancipation and expansion of their freedoms. It is only deductively that we arrive at the 
other aspects of development, for instance, the idea that economic growth and a reduction 
in poverty and inequalities will make Africans more free to live the lives they choose. But 
even this is only a leap of faith because it is possible for a nation to be declared free of 
poverty and as having a good economic performance while people live in social and 
political unfreedoms (Sen, 1999). In other words, the millennium goals put too much 
emphasis on the economic deliverables thereby compromising NEPAD’s democratic 
ideals.  
Section 47 of this development paradigm is equally problematic. Acknowledging that “the 
agenda is being set by the leaders for the renewal of the continent” further removes the 
ordinary citizens from the picture as owners and makers of policy except as beneficiaries, a 
clear example of an exogenous development agenda. The Schumpeterian framework of the 
programme is made evident in the sense that it requires “…bold and imaginative leadership 
so that the trend of poverty is reversed in Africa…” (NEPAD Article 6). This view 
becomes reinforced when some national citizenship education programmes, such as those 
of Malawi, see NEPAD as “… an international agreement under which the African states 
that sign up in NEPAD promise to put in place governance processes and practices. In 
return, countries such as the United States of America, the United Kingdom, France, 
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Germany, Canada, Japan and other rich countries promise the African countries financial 
help…” (Chirwa, Kanyongolo, & Kayambazinthu, 2004, p.149). The education for citizen 
participation hence becomes a side effect of the exogenic programmes. 
Patrick Bond (www.web.net/~iccaf/debtsap/nepad_aidc.htm, accessed 25/10/2004) notes 
that one of NEPAD’s weaknesses resides in its formulation phase where little consultation 
was made with the peoples of Africa. In other words, the people’s ideals, wishes, ambitions 
and aspiration are not directly reflected in this agenda. He observes,  
 … During the formulation of NEPAD, no trade union, civil society group, 
church, political-party, parliamentary, or other potentially democratic or 
progressive forces were consulted. In contrast, extensive consultations occurred 
with the World Bank and IMF (November 2000 and February 2001), trans-
national corporations and associated government leaders (at Davos in January 
2001 and New York in February 2002), the G-8 (in Tokyo in July 2000 and 
Genoa in July 2001), the European Union (November 2001) and individual 
Northern heads of state … (ibid) 
The Africa Social Forum (2002) and other critics also think that NEPAD represents a neo-
imperial agenda for Africa. and that it needs replacement because there was “… no genuine 
commitment to involve the citizens of Africa actively in decisions and programmes 
targeting at their destiny and reflecting a citizen-centred development process as an 
imperative…” (www.worldsummit2002.org/texts/NEPADExecSummaryFinal.pdf, p.4, 
accessed 17/11/2004). This forum holds that values of respect for life would have reigned 
superior to profit values and the ‘triumphalism’ of scientific and technological advances. In 
other words, values of UBUNTU remain overshadowed in NEPAD  
In conclusion, this section recognises the strides NEPAD makes in fostering democracy 
and development. It places some emphasis on the urgency of African peoples to develop 
their continent. In fact development is regarded as empowering to the people. The 
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document also makes a number of calls to African leaders to create enabling conditions for 
the participation of people in their development. Nevertheless, I do not think that NEPAD 
moves far enough towards creating active citizenship in Africa. NEPAD is bogged down 
by a number of problems such as the general characteristic that it does not really represent 
the aspirations from the people except those of its leadership. Its pre-occupation with 
industrialization and techno-development reduce it efforts to mount a holistic development 
programme, from where active citizenship could more readily have been cultivated. What 
compounds NEPAD’s lack in cultivating active democratic citizenship is also the fact that 
its development goals have very little to do with democracy and democratic citizenship 
apart from being an enabling condition for its ‘sustainable development’. Democracy is 
only incidental to the development of Africa. The intrinsic values of a democracy are not 
the primary interests in NEPAD’s agenda, neither is the parallel implementation of 
development and democracy programmes. 
 
4.3 The dichotomy between democracy and development: a missing ‘kairotic’ 
moment 
The dichotomous relationship between development and democracy should not be assumed 
as obvious and necessary. That not much attention has been paid to the possibilities of 
running simultaneous processes of development and democracy does not mean that the two 
cannot operate simultaneously. For instance, as early as 1990, Norway’s foreign 
development policy dismissed this dichotomy when it noted that the commitment to the 
observance of human rights was not an independent or separate goal from that of 
development (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Fighting Poverty Together – a 
comprehensive Development Policy). The Universal Declaration on Human Rights, Article 
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55, notes that in order to ensure peace and development, it is also necessary to promote the 
universal respect and observance of human rights and fundamental freedom. Development 
and democracy co-operate within an indispensable relationship. This dissertation argues 
that it is untenable to make one precede another because the process of expanding people’s 
freedoms is in itself development. In other words, there is no ‘kairos’ moment7 at which 
Malawi’s and other African countries’ development will be enough for them to start 
democratising. The apparent dichotomy between development and democracy puts all 
education for democratic citizenship in disarray and the spontaneity and reciprocity of 
human life and relationships becomes stale. 
Much as poverty, hunger, civil strife, and perpetual regression of development work have 
become associated with Africa, it is not the case that these factors further regress Africa’s 
democratisation and education for democratic citizenship. Research done in about 10 sub-
Saharan countries between 1999 and 2000 shows that it is more difficult to sustain 
democracy in poor societies than in relatively wealthy societies, but fails to find sufficient 
evidence why poverty is believed to be the main cause for the inhibition of democratic 
values (Afrobarometer Briefing Paper No. 4, January 2003, www.afrobarometer.org, 
accessed on 2/10/2004). The belief that links poverty to lack of democratisation also links 
people’s powerlessness in economics and lack of information about their own political 
system to the resultant political powerlessness. 
Nevertheless, the disparaging views about the inability of Africa to democratise because of 
poverty have no empirical justification. The Afrobarometer, using ‘lived poverty and 
individual political values and behaviours’ (ABP 4. pp6-8), shows no linkage between 
individual poverty and individual citizenship behaviours and preferences. Four research 
                                                
A “Kairos Moment” has been used to be understood as an opportune time at which something 
comes to be as a culmination of certain processes.  
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results indicate, “… poverty does not only fail to decrease interests in politics, but actually 
increases it …” (p.6-7). Poverty only manages to reduce people’s exposure to media news 
and their ability to live and act to their own expectations. Second, poverty does not affect 
how people define ‘democracy’ as a set of political procedures. The results show that the 
poorer people become the more they are likely to define democracy within a substantive set 
of goods such as health and education (p.7). Thirdly, the results showed that people who go 
without basic necessities are likely to attend more community meetings, and contact their 
political leaders. In addition, the research also shows that poor people are twice as much 
more likely to urge government to urgent action on substantive goods such as healthcare, 
national economy, commodity prices and others, than those who are relatively managing in 
life. 
Going by our marks, this means that poor people are more likely to appreciate and embrace 
participatory forms of democracy alongside substantive and republican forms of freedom 
and human rights. In other words, poverty, despite its dark side, creates a sense of 
democratic urgency and a desire to exercise political agency. This is more the reason why 
development and democracy should be seen as one and the same process. Hence the case 
of poverty in Malawi and in the sub-Saharan countries does not create any imperative for 
us to derail education for democratic participation and active citizenship and make 
development, so technocratically understood, our only priority. Poverty creates the urgency 
and impels us to create educational structures and methodologies that will promote both 
democracy and development; cultivate the people’s liking for democratic procedures as the 
only way to their social, political and economic development. Sen (1999) and Ake (1996) 
have suggested competitive frameworks for conceptualising such simultaneous processes 
of development and democracy in the education for democratic citizenship.  
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4.4 Development as freedom8: Sen’s proactive solutions 
Sen (1999) sums up and examines the assumed dichotomy between development and 
democracy in three ways. His examination of the Lee Thesis acknowledges the existence of 
the belief that freedoms and rights hamper economic growth and development. The second 
assumption that he examines is the belief that poor people would choose fulfilling 
economic needs rather than care about social and political freedoms, if they were given the 
freedom to choose between the two. This assumption presupposes a sharp conflict between 
socio-political freedoms and the fulfilment of economic needs (Sen, p.148-149). He also 
examines the belief that political freedoms, liberties and democracy are a “Western 
priority” (ibid) and opposed to African/Asian cultural values.  
From Sen’s point of view, the above understanding of the relationship between 
development and democracy is essentially flawed. Sen (1999) notes that such an 
understanding uses a historical fallacy of thinking that since some democracies have 
developed after sustaining stable economic achievements, then no democracy is possible 
without a firm economic base; or that the economically underdeveloped countries have no 
chance of being democratic until their economies have become stable or developed. 
Although there are limited historical cases where authoritarian governments have been the 
most successful; authoritarianism does not necessarily lead to economic growth, as the 
argument would want us to believe. Sen (1999) notes, “…there is little general evidence 
that authoritarian governance and the suppression of political and civil rights are really 
beneficial in encouraging economic growth…” (p.150). The growth of GNP or some other 
indicators is not a sufficient indicator of economic development for a nation. Citing 
poverty as a deterrent to democratic participation also does not pass Sen’s test. Sen argues 
                                                
8 The title of this subsection reflects Sen’s (1999) book titled: Development as Freedom (USA: 
Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.), which provides the framework of the alternative I am presenting for re-
conceptualising the relationship between development and democracy in Africa. 
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that the cases that are cited in defence of this assumption are themselves authoritarian and 
there is no point in supposing that if poor people were given a choice between political 
freedoms and food they would obviously choose the food. In this case, Sen leaves open the 
idea that even poor people can opt for social and political freedoms amidst a realised sense 
of poverty. The argument that cites poverty as a deterrent to political participation is even 
more flawed because of its simplistic comparison between the choice for food and that for 
political freedoms, which is likely to end up in a categorical fallacy (see also 
Afrobarometer, Briefing Paper No. 4). 
The idea that the values of freedoms, liberties and democracy are a “Western priority” is 
also flawed because it rests on another false assumption: that liberty is a western value! 
This false assumption denies Africans the possession of the concept of liberty in their 
traditional cultures, as if traditional culture in Africa is completely mechanistic, 
deterministic and authoritarian such that people never enjoy any freedom whatsoever. 
Despite the prevalence of traditional patterns of life in Africa, research on African 
Traditions does not support the view of an African culture that is devoid of notions of 
freedom (see Mbiti, 1990; Hountondji, 1996). On the other hand, Sen (1999) tries to reply 
to the argument through a comparative analysis of Eastern and Oriental religions. He notes 
that the values of personal freedom and equality have been present in other cultures as well 
for a long time in history. The ideas of the nobility of conduct, liberation, and free choice 
have equally played important roles in these cultures that are seen as authoritarian by some 
western perspectives (Sen, p.235).  
What is really problematic in the above case is the concept of freedom/liberty, which the 
argument assumes to be in use. The question of whose freedom or liberty is at stake largely 
depends on how we opt to define our reality, and on whether it is the individual or 
community that defines it. Defining through communal eyes makes freedom acquire a 
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communal perspective where freedom resides in what community defines as freedom. 
Western societies similarly define the same freedom from the individual’s eye and such a 
definition does not mean other perspectives are fraudulent. Much as we cannot dispute the 
primacy of individual persons and meaning-giving, we can neither dispute the right of 
societies to define themselves and the confines of their freedom. In other words, it is 
logically incorrect to assume that democracy operates only with liberal values of 
autonomy. According to Sen, the cultural-specific argument assumes that once democracy 
is regarded as found and nourished by liberal values, then all democracy all times must live 
within liberal traditions. Other traditions than the liberal tradition also have the capacity to 
live within values considered the sole reserve of the liberal tradition. In other words, values 
that have been associated with liberalism are not an exclusive entitlement of liberalism. 
Hence the claim that freedom and democracy are a western priority, therefore, is 
tantamount to the claim for superiority and power by those who propagate the idea and by 
western culture itself. 
The competitive concept of development that Sen (1999) constructs moves away from 
traditional models of theorising development and regards development as “the process of 
expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy and have reason to enjoy” (p. 3). Hence 
development becomes “…the expansion of the capabilities of people to lead the kind of 
lives they have value and reason to live…” (ibid). Sen’s redefinition makes neither 
freedom nor development the sole preserve of one particular culture or tradition. Two 
distinct aspects come up in Sen’s re-conceptualisation of development. In the first place, 
Sen places enormous importance on the role of human capabilities in development. While 
it is true that all development is meant to ease human life, it is not the case that all 
development takes the human person as a priority in some of its considerations. For 
instance, acquisition of high-tech materials may not have the people who are going to use 
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the gargets in mind and the extent of freedoms created by them, except for the profits that 
will be generated. It could simply be an aspect of economic competition. As such, not all 
technological and infrastructural development would expand the freedoms people enjoy as 
their primary objectives. Needless to say that some of NEPAD’s conceptions, for instance, 
do not have the people at their heart, other than matching the development rate of Africa 
with other developed parts of the world.  
In a second way, Sen’s re-conceptualisation brings a holistic perspective into the discussion 
of the notion of development. It marks a shift away from the hyper economic and 
technological concept of development, from a conception of development that emphasises 
GNP and other economically determined indicators and moves the concept of development 
towards the humanistic end, where human beings become the ultimate deciders and 
beneficiaries; where removing the unfreedoms people face in their life becomes the essence 
of development (Sen, p.36). In this way, one’s ideas of development reach their fulfilment 
when the faculties - social, moral, and intellectual - of people are also improved (Mill, 
1996). But it is not possible to think of the expansion of the capabilities people have if their 
faculties are not similarly taken into consideration.  
Sen regards substantive freedoms as “…the capabilities to choose a life one has reason to 
value…” (p.74) The capability approach that Sen is proposing also considers “…alternative 
combinations of functioning that are feasible for one to achieve…” as central (p.75). In 
other words, freedom involves a person’s capability to achieve the things that can be 
achieved given one’s level of achievement. A person is not free, therefore, if she or he 
cannot achieve that which is possible within one’s limits. Such a condition also results in 
negative development. Hence development consists of setting the persons free to realise 
what they are capable of achieving in their lives alongside the improvement of their 
functioning. This conception of development is broader than conceiving development in 
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terms of infrastructure and technology, for instance. The latter do not necessarily and 
directly free people’s capacity to be persons they desire to be. Although such may be the 
case, the overall freedoms that people enjoy are also enhanced by what Sen (1999) calls 
instrumental freedoms. These include political freedoms, economic facilities, social 
opportunities, transparency guarantees and protective security (p.38). “…The instrumental 
freedoms tend to contribute to the general capability of a person to live more freely, while 
they also serve to complement each other…” (ibid). The capability approach to citizenship 
education and development is more extensive. 
According to Sen, freedom and development are intertwined processes for two main 
reasons. Primarily, it is because no human progress can be legitimately evaluated without 
considering whether the freedoms people have reason to value are promoted (p.4). Self-
assessment is therefore a necessary component of any education for democratic citizenship. 
Sen emphasizes that the development of any society can only be evaluated primarily by the 
substantive freedoms that the members of the society enjoy (p.18). Sen (1999) thinks that 
this approach goes beyond other methods of assessing development, such as the conception 
of considering a system fair or just by recognising the priority of personal liberty or the 
realisation of the greatest possible happiness. He thinks that the latter often injures those 
who are not possibly in larger number of beneficiaries (see Sen, 199, p.63- 72). Although 
Rawls’ egalitarian project includes social and economic factors, Sen (1999) thinks it still 
does not provide us with an adequate concept of development because it loses focus of the 
role of human capabilities in the event that resources are redistributed to achieve justice. 
By including the role and cultivation of human capabilities as central to development itself, 
Sen extends the dimension of the inter-relation between democracy and development. If 
adopted and applied properly, the concept of ‘development as freedom’ is likely to refresh 
NEPAD’s approach to development and democratic citizenship education, where 
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development is considered from a technological perspective; and democracy is regarded as 
an enabling condition for development.  
Sen’s proposal for a newer version of development compliments, in many ways, the 
proposals that Ake (1996) makes on Africa. Ake’s concept of a renewed sense of 
democracy is one in which real decision-making power lies with the people in addition to 
the electoral choice (Ake, pp. 132–142). Such repositioning turns the people into agents 
and ends of their own development with the process of development. As a result, 
citizenship becomes enhanced through empowerment, confidence and self-realisation. 
 
4.5 Educating citizens for freedom and development 
This chapter has tried to show that educating citizens for freedom accelerates and broadens 
the process of development. This argument is made against the common approaches, some 
of which this debate has brought to the fore, that poor nations like Malawi and other 
African countries should pay more attention to development than to democracy. While it is 
acknowledged that western countries developed first before democratising, it is not the case 
that a certain technical development threshold is a prerequisite for democracy and people’s 
participation. The projects-approach to development is parochial because it narrows down 
the concept of development, thereby introducing minimalist conceptions of people’s 
participation in development. The approach overlooks the wider implications of adopting a 
broader concept of development, which apart from adopting multiple facets of what 
development is, also seeks to develop the capacity of people to live the lives they want. 
The Afrobarometer results quoted above show that most poor people maintain a 
substantive notion of democracy stretching far beyond mere political affirming to the 
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affirmation of simultaneous processes of democracy and development. This approach seeks 
to improve the faculties of people as they engage in both development and democracy. 
The capability approach in education for democracy and development is incomparable to 
other previous approaches. While this approach seeks to improve all human faculties so 
that people are enabled to live their lives to the full, it also includes the removal of all 
unfreedoms: social, economic and political. It seeks to develop people’s greater sense of 
freedom to do the things they have reason to value. This approach is significant in itself 
and also for one’s overall freedom. Educating people for this model of democratic 
participation enhances their overall freedom. Freedom is not only a basis for the evaluation 
of success and failure, but it is also a principal determinant of individual initiative and 
social effectiveness. Greater freedom enhances the ability of people to help themselves and 
change their lives and systems. Hence the intertwining relation between development and 
democratic citizenship is more likely to develop active citizenship and participation. 
The following chapter examines how conceptions of democracy, freedom, human rights 
and development are depicted in Malawi’s citizenship education materials. It also 
endeavours to show that although certain forms of maximalist citizenship are evident, by 
and large, Malawi’s approach is likely to promote passive citizenship. The section then 
highlights the disadvantages of minimalist conceptions in preference for strong and active 
citizenship education. 
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CHAPTER FIVE  
CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION IN MALAWI: THE SEARCH FOR 
DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION 
5.1 A civic education ‘vacuum’: an historical introduction 
This chapter sets out to show how citizenship education in Malawi predominantly reflects a 
representative, minimal conception of democracy. Concurrently with this view, it also 
shows that the dominant approach to development in Malawi has created an erroneous 
dichotomy between development and democracy. But in order for us to establish why 
education for democratic citizenship in Malawi between 1994 and the present is like this, it 
is imperative that we understand the background on which such citizenship education is 
being built. This analysis starts with the independence period (1964 – 1992/3) because of 
its influence on the post-independence period (post 1994). 
Malawi’s citizenship education, after independence, was inculcated through the official 
political and educational system by the use of state agencies. Political rallies, a controlled 
school curriculum, and the Malawi Young Pioneers (MYP) were the major state agents. 
The school curriculum and its daily activities were heavily screened and censored by the 
state. In recounting forms of citizenship education in the first period, Englund (2004) 
quoting Kasambara (1998) states: 
Primary schools had a subject known as civics, giving deliberately unspecific 
view of government, while the Malawi Young Pioneers visited villages to impose 
physical and agricultural training on adults. As with much else that took place in 
public, the glorification of the country’s Life President was an integral part of 
this activity. (p. 5-6) 
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Government’s effort to conduct civic education during the independence period centred on 
four themes: Unity, Loyalty, Obedience and Discipline. These were also called the Four 
Cornerstones and the foundation of the nation (Kasambara, 1998, p.240-243). These 
cornerstones became the primary values and objects of knowledge for all citizens. Below, 
we see how the promotion of these values assisted in developing a passive sense of 
citizenship in Malawi.  
The theme of unity was used in order to bring the diverse groups of the nation under one 
leadership. This theme also evoked sentiments of developing the nation into a single family 
like the extended family in the traditional system. As time went by the ideal was used to 
suppress views that diverged from mainstream political thought, that were essentially ideas 
of the president that were encased in the Malawi Congress Party (MCP). Unity was 
understood as unanimity of views and perspectives on all political issues. The ideal of 
choosing a representative for effective government as one finds in Mill’s formula of 
representation (Mill, 1996) was understood to mean that people’s political views should 
also converge as a symbol of being united under a single leader. Difference became a threat 
to national unity, an act of sedition. The ideal of loyalty was used to demand allegiance to 
the dictates of the single political party system. Attendance at party meetings, purchasing 
of party membership cards and actual subscription to party ideals were made compulsory. 
Other than being a symbol for homogenous thought, unity also became a symbol for 
maintaining a hierarchical order and due ‘respect’ for the status quos in society. Lack of 
such respect turned individuals into enemies of the state, whereas obedience and 
unwavering docility were considered public virtues.  
Discipline and obedience were also demanded alongside unity and loyalty. These were 
used in the same way as the first two in order to demand citizen allegiance to what the 
party cum government wanted, to its letter. A disciplined and obedient citizen was one who 
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could not question what the party and its leadership were demanding. Such a citizen would 
also take proper recognition of hierarchies in society. The effects of these values on actual 
citizen dispositions were, among others, lack of citizen initiative to engage in action that 
was not properly sanctioned by the system for fear of reprisals. Citizens became docile to 
party and government demands. In this regime, all power and honour belonged to the life 
president, and any claims thereof, even when apolitical, were perceived as open defiance to 
the country’s leadership. This leadership described itself as dynamic, charismatic, 
messianic and wise.  
The four cornerstones virtually became the centre of all citizenship education in Malawi for 
30 years, from 1964 to 1993; and they permeated all aspects of life in the nation. As a 
result, citizens in most cases kept their political views to themselves and attended forced 
political rallies just for the sake of pleasing authorities and keeping out of trouble. 
Imprisonment without trial, political detentions and loss of property were some of the 
punishments meted on those who dared oppose the system. For this reason it is difficult to 
argue that there was meaningful political participation of free agents within these 
circumstances. This dissertation argues that the background described above is very likely 
to create a passive citizenry. And as such, it is also very likely that citizens educated 
through such a system would not meaningfully participate in the civic affairs of the nation.  
It may be counter-argued that the above introduction begs the question: What is citizenship 
education? Of course, whether the background described above amounts to anything like a 
citizenship education or a mal-education becomes problematic. Englund (2003) thinks that 
perceptions of the period, as described by Kasambara, affirm that there was no citizenship 
education. Kasambara (1998) has argued: “… political and social life was completely 
hegemonised by the ruling and sole political party, the masses were completely silenced 
into thinking along party lines, and that a majority of Malawians were left ill-equipped for 
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meaningful participation in the political life of the nation…” (p.238). Despite Kasambara’s 
rhetoric, the recognition of lack of proper citizenship education, a mal-education of the 
masses, does not mean absence of civic education. While the prevalent education for 
citizens was hegemonic and intolerant to diverse and opposing views, there was a form of 
citizenship education although accompanied by undesirable outcomes, non-democratic 
tendencies such as the imposing of views on what the general public was allowed to think 
about and the suppression of a critical attitude to public issues in general.  
If we were to reconsider Kasambara’s thoughts from the perspective of Barber’s (1984) 
repositioning of citizenship education, the idea that there was no civic education outside 
the Ministry of Education classrooms because hegemonism reigned would become evident. 
In this period, civic education courses such as Civics taught about different systems of 
government, the duties and responsibilities of citizens, the role and duties of central and 
local government, and the election process (Kasambara, p.239). The narrow scope of 
Civics leaves a lot to be desired from such democratic position. Civics, among others, 
avoided discussion of current political issues. Learners were not encouraged to think 
actively of what their political system meant to them. It became an ordinary and an 
apolitical subject, and was not intended for the cultivation of civic virtues except for some 
forms of civic knowledge. The broader perspective of this course saw it complimented by 
other secondary schools’ citizenship education programmes taught by the MYP, which 
concentrated on physical education and limited forms of political education in terms of 
teaching political structures to the learners. All of these were also confined to the 
glorification of Dr Banda’s statesmanship (ibid). This system, which was immune from all 
critical reflection and criticism, within and without, could not be a favourable ground for 
cultivating democratic citizenship.  
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The question of lack of citizenship education could still arise in reference to the apparent 
naturalisation of the political and the deliberate efforts to keep the masses ignorant. This 
thinking acknowledges citizenship education as proper if and only if it is geared to actively 
engage the citizens in their affairs. In this case, the form of citizenship on the ground was 
such that it fundamentally disabled the citizen from carrying out meaningful civic duties. 
The four cornerstones discussed above were a form of citizenship but their formulation 
resulted in curbing the exercise of meaningful citizen engagement in the affairs of the 
public. The vacuum in citizenship education, therefore, relates to a deliberate attempt to 
keep everyone and everything apolitical. People were made to believe that issues of basic 
survival such as food, shelter and clothing were their only concern and that these had 
nothing to do with politics. Such a conception of Malawian citizenship misses out on the 
other dynamics of human life such as the extent to which people exercise their social, 
political and economic freedoms. In this stage of Malawi’s history citizens were taught and 
expected to be passive, unquestioning citizens. 
 
5.1.1 Citizenship education as voter education: an historical aberration 
The need for a new democratic citizenship and citizenship education in Malawi arose in 
1992 when the system was changing from a single party system of government to a multi-
party system. New forms of citizenship education erupted as a result of the campaign for 
democracy and a multiparty system of government. Those who opposed the system of the 
day promoted a multi-party system of government whereas those who saw otherwise 
continued to support the single party system. The latter continued to promote values of 
unity, obedience, loyalty and discipline. The former began to promote human rights and an 
end to human rights abuse as the sole advantage of a democratic system. 
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The intense re-development of citizenship education in Malawi was supposed to mark a 
shift from a patriotic position of knowing one’s obligations and duties within the 
framework of strong political hegemony, to the recognition and an understanding of 
difference in politics and the cultivation of democratic citizenship virtues, duties and 
obligations. Unfortunately, the early on-set of citizenship education for democracy 
assumed to deliver its mandate by simple comparison of single party system of government 
from a multiparty system of government. This approach resulted in citizenship education 
being equated with voter education in relation to the upcoming referendum of 1993 and the 
general elections of 1994. Secondly, what prompted a change of political system in Malawi 
were the alarming levels of human rights violations. Discontent about the national state of 
affairs among the citizens was observed in the universities, among members of the law 
society and in churches and businesses (Kasambara, p.240). The onset of democratic forms 
of citizenship in Malawi was also surrounded by factors such as lack of opposition parties, 
official disrespect of various types of human freedoms and rights. Pastoral letters, 
anonymous political writings and mass demonstrations became a way of persuading 
international governments and donor agencies to intervene in Malawi’s socio-political life. 
This initial background affected the nature and method of conducting citizenship education 
as well as its agents and method. A human rights approach to citizenship education became 
inevitable. 
The agents who conduct citizenship programmes as well as the choice of the nature and 
content of such citizenship education influence modes of citizenship education currently in 
practice in Malawi. Two sets of key players can be highlighted at this point. The national 
department of education and the national broadcaster, the Malawi Broadcasting 
Cooperation (MBC), were officially mandated to impart civic education. The two ended up 
promoting the single party ideals because of the control the single party system had on 
 86
these national institutions. As such, their emphasis was placed on the purported advantages 
of single party politics such as the ability to unite diverse groups. The proponents also 
assumed and taught that a single system of politics is capable of maintaining law and order 
in the state; that there were the orderliness of state affairs, and the easier prospects for 
development under these conditions. They imparted a citizenship education that was 
centrally geared to protecting the system of the day. 
On the other hand, the pressure groups who later became parties, and other non-
governmental organisations (NGOs)9, concentrated on teaching the people the “…reasons 
for the referendum; what citizens were expected to do on voting day; their duty as citizens 
in taking part in the referendum…” (Kasambara, p.243). While they claimed neutrality, the 
efforts of these groups endeavoured to provide people with a choice that had long been 
denied. The Civil Liberties Committee (CILIC) and the Legal Resource Centre (LRC) 
promoted voter rights education. This education assumes that by voting, the citizens are 
ensuring a democratic regime that would protect and promote their rights. In other words, 
the voter education approach that was adopted was intended to offset the legacy of 
elections as mere endorsement of pre-chosen candidates favourable to the ruling 
leadership, which had prevailed in the single party system.  
In the 1999 and 2004 elections, the orientation towards voter education as civic education 
did not change, partly confirming Kasambara’s (1998) observation that there is general 
failure on the part of government to embark on full-fledged citizenship education (p.251). 
The National Initiative for Civic Education (NICE) is one such example. In one of its 
policy documents, NICE places civic education programmes into two phases (Faiti, 1999). 
The first phase, usually a run-up to general elections, concentrates on ‘civic and voter 
                                                
9 The NGOs involved, although not at the same time, were Public Affairs Committee (PAC), Malawi Law 
Society (MLS), Legal Resource Centre (LRC), Civil Liberties Committee (CILIC), National Initiative for 
Civic Education (NICE). The prominent pressure groups that turned into parties were United Democratic 
Front (UDF) and Alliance for Democracy (AFORD), among others.  
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education’ in order to reduce voter apathy, whereas the second stage deals with the creation 
of a data bank of civic education trainers; creation of outreach programmes and provision 
of sources of democratic knowledge through the creation of community /district libraries 
(p. 4). The trainers and outreach programmes in the second phase are also mentioned in 
relation to voter education and elections. 
Apart from understanding citizenship education in terms of a simple comparison between a 
single party system of government and a multiparty system of government on the one hand 
and simply as voter education on the other hand, several problems have dogged Malawi’s 
efforts towards teaching for democratic citizenship. Most of the citizenship education 
efforts in Malawi are ad hoc. The need for civic education is perceived as necessary only 
prior to elections and government does not seem to be prepared for massive citizenship 
education (Kasambara, op. cit, p.241). Apart from the fact that civic education providers 
focus on far too few and narrow topics, there does not seem to have been a civic education 
curriculum and a Malawi-specific reference book for use by stakeholders (Kamphambe 
Nkhoma, in Chirwa, et al, 2004, Foreword, p. iv). On the other hand, Chirwa thinks that 
lack of and poor citizenship education in Malawi is much due to poverty and its 
disempowering effects on people, which eventually reduce their political will (pp.208 – 
210). They also think that institutions expected to be democratic such as public (sector) 
institutions do not generate enough trust among Malawians, hence they are seedbeds for 
low-level democratic participation (see Chirwa et. al, pp 216-219). Nevertheless, the 
argument that a negative mindset is created by the failure to meet the basic standard of life 
for prolonged periods due to poverty, low salaries, regionalism and tribalism and the 
vulnerability of the poor against political manipulation is difficult to sustain (see 4.3, 
above). I have shown in this regard that poverty is not necessarily antithetical to the 
cultivation of a political will that is required for citizen participation in democracy. 
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 5.2 Major areas of citizenship education programmes in Malawi. 
In order to show that Malawi’s citizenship education reflects representative and minimal 
conceptions of democracy, this sub-section examines how themes of democracy and 
participation, human rights and freedom, and the interplay between development and 
democracy are depicted in the citizenship education materials. The materials under 
question are those that are used in teacher training programmes, voter and civic education 
materials used by NICE and other groups, and the newly introduced ‘Democracy 
Consolidation’ materials. While the inadequacies of the current modes are being exposed, 
the dissertation will also highlight how citizenship education within a democratic Malawi 
should be approached in order to develop active democratic citizenship.  
 
5.2.1 Democracy and participation 
Citizenship education materials in Malawi have largely been pre-occupied with trying to 
define and characterize democracy (see: Gwira Mpini Kwacha, 1996; Teacher 
Development Unit – Student Teacher Handbook; Chirwa, Kayambazinthu & Kanyongolo, 
2004). Most of such characterizations fluctuate between terminological definitions of rights 
and duties of citizens in a nation to functions of an elected government. For instance 
descriptions of the electoral system rest on the idea that people choose who is to lead them 
and the leaders have to follow the wishes of the electorate. Nevertheless, the materials 
largely concede that there is no single system known as the democratic system except what 
the majority agree on. This can easily be taken to imply a loose conception of democracy 
whereby whatever people agree on is justifiably democratic to them. The vernacular 
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position “…anthu okhala m’dziko limodzi angathe kugwirizana pakati pao njira yoyenera 
kuyendetsera demokalase…” (translated as: citizens within a nation concede to adopt a 
way of conducting themselves democratically) (Gwira Mpini Kwacha, p.2) epitomises this 
thinking. Apart from aspects of self-determination that the understanding brings out, it 
largely remains very fluid or non-definitive on the meaning and implications of democracy 
and its processes. While citizens’ consent is a necessary, it is not a sufficient condition for 
democratic life, more so that which is intended to cultivate active democratic citizenship.  
The idea of citizen power is one of the frequent features in Malawi’s citizenship education 
materials. This ‘power’ is described in terms of the capacity of citizens to participate in 
“…civic affairs of one’s community…” (Teacher Development Unit, Student Teacher 
Handbook, p.870); the people’s rights to political activity; power to decide how and who is 
to govern them (op. cit., p. 990; Community Civic Educators’ Voter Education Handbook, 
p.11). Nevertheless, the recognition that power rests with the participation of all citizens in 
the political life of the nation (ibid) appears to reside in the ability of citizens to choose 
representatives, to make decisions, to formulate laws and also the power to administer 
programmes for the good of the community (Teachers’ Handbook, pp.990-1). The 
materials also indicate that once government is in power it can only be challenged in the 
next election polls, since the consent of the people “…is expressed though … periodic 
elections…” (Chirwa, et. al., p.56).  
The materials also promote the assumption that the will of the people is known and carried 
out through the government. General elections and a referendum are regarded the crucial 
forms of this expression. Some direct ways for the same expression of the people’s will 
include demonstrations, boycotts, strikes or petitions (Chirwa, et. al, p.45). Although 
Chirwa does not try to indicate how often and to what extent such direct means of 
participation the system can allow bearing in mind their retrogressive character, it is 
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obvious that these means are regarded as rare and periodical otherwise the democratic 
system itself would collapse. As such, this mode of democratic participation, at best, puts 
citizens on the receiving end as their participation becomes reactive rather than proactive 
since the quest for reasons in public affairs is far removed from being a habit of seeking for 
reasons in affairs of society.  
Direct forms of participation such as demonstrations, boycotts or mass action have often 
been barred by the Malawi Police. This leaves people with periodic participation as their 
only option. This scenario consequently leads to a conception of the democratic process as 
people’s handover of their will and power to government so that government acts on their 
behalf. No wonder, it has also been referred to as state management of the behaviour of the 
people within its borders and the distribution of resources to the same people through 
government (op. cit., p.46). Such an understanding turns citizens into spectators of their 
system. 
Civic education materials in Malawi perceive democracy as a political process, a social 
process and also as a moral value (op. cit., p.88). As a political process, they argue that 
democratic government concerns people’s will, consent, participation and the good derived 
from the system. As a social process, democracy is seen as comprising the “…continuous 
process of promoting, respecting and upholding people’s rights…” (ibid). The moral 
dimension of democracy consists of people’s aspirations for a better social and economic 
order from which democracy’s imperative is also drawn. The ideal of participation and the 
moral dimension indicate a substantive notion of democracy. Nevertheless, the feeling that 
participatory forms of democracy are difficult to arrange because they demand that 
everyone directly takes part in the exercise of choice when a major decision has to be taken 
(op. cit., p.93) defeats the chances of cultivating maximal citizenship. Hence representative 
forms of government are opted for because of their apparent easiness in implementation. 
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The citizenship education materials associate democracy with principles of equality, 
tolerance, participation, regular free and fair elections, a multiparty system, rule of law, 
accountability and transparency, control of abuse of power, human rights and 
responsibilities and economic freedoms (Student Teachers Handbook, pp 991-995). The 
materials recognise that all people are equal, alongside the idea that we need to recognise 
differences in cultures, personalities, languages and beliefs (p.991). Nevertheless, equality 
is regarded as more a fundamental aspect of society than the recognition of difference since 
no further effort is made to explore how recognition of difference is a valued asset to the 
democratic process. In many cases, recognition of difference is played down, except where 
it stands as a foundation for tolerance (Teacher Development Unit, p.992, Gwira Mpini 
Kwacha, p.2). The understanding of equality commonly evoked is that which is associated 
with the just society, equality before the law, equal freedoms and opportunities of all 
people within a nation (Chirwa, et. al, pp.89-90). Similarly, freedom is taken as “… the 
creation of political, social or economic spaces between one individual and others..” (p.90). 
As such, the materials promote a liberal democratic society and not necessarily a 
republican conception of society (see also Chapter Three). For instance political freedom is 
said to involve the ability to have views and to talk about what one thinks and believes in; 
the right to associate with others and move freely without hindrances; whereas economic 
freedom relates to private property rights, rights to work and freedom from forced labour. 
The social freedoms equally take a liberal stance as they are perceived to be about fair 
treatment of all (each individual person) and the non-interference and the avoidance of 
inhumane treatment of other people. (op. cit. p.91) 
Democratic participation is largely understood in terms of it being a citizen’s right and 
duty. This participation is seen as involving standing for election, debating issues, 
attending civic meetings, being members of organizations, paying taxes and protesting 
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(Student Teacher Handbook, p.992), and these are regarded as obligations in the 
democratic society (Gwira Mpini Kwacha, pp.2-3). Nevertheless, the right to participation 
falls short of delivering an active citizenship conception. The central framework of 
participation conceives the citizens as the acted upon and the political leaders as the actors. 
Proper participation by citizens involves the ability to control abuse of power by leaders; 
taking part in elections; informing their leaders about their problems and making sure 
leaders respond to these problems (Gwira Mpini Kwacha, p.11). In other words, such 
conceptions of participation do not consider the representative and the represented as 
equals who equally have the capacity to set the agenda, interrogate, and arrive at agreed 
solutions together. Other rights include those of expression and the press; association and 
the right to access information even if state bodies hold the information. These rights are 
understood as a pre-requisite to participation (Chirwa, et. al., pp.110, 322). In other words, 
given a situation where there is no abuse of power, no elections, and no problems 
impinging on society for immediate solutions and where leaders are dutiful without being 
reminded to do so, citizen participation becomes unnecessary. The major forms of 
participation evoked in this conception are likely to promote passive citizenship despite the 
recognition of citizens’ right to demand information of their government. The dominant 
understanding considers proper participation as residing in the leaders. Consequently, the 
citizenship education materials easily make concessions to voting as the easiest and most 
accessible form of democratic participation (op. cit., p.12). The terms ‘participation’ and 
‘consultation’ are also used interchangeably (Chirwa, et. al., p.110). 
Democratic participation is taken to mean information–sharing, consultation, joint 
decision-making and initiation, and control by stakeholders. Not much space is given to 
ordinary citizens here because their idea of stake-holding does not include the masses, but 
only organisations or bodies that are representative of the general citizen population. Civil 
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society organisations are given more space than the citizens. This conception of democratic 
participation, while appearing maximal, limits the level of participation needed for a 
democratic culture as consultations become the routine requirements of the system. The 
nature of consultations above fail the deliberative test as people are put at different levels 
of importance thereby abrogating the deliberative conditions of equality and the capacity of 
all to initiate and set conditions of the discussions as well as to question and interrogate 
issues as equals (see Benhabib, 1996).  
The Malawian citizenry is also considered to meaningfully take part in the affairs of their 
government through the cabinet, the judiciary and the legislature (Chirwa, et. al., p.112-
113). But the reference to citizen participation in formulating policies such as Vision 2020, 
the Poverty Alleviation Programme, the Malawi Poverty Reduction Strategy and others 
(p.112), as the citizenship education manual would want us to believe, is difficult to 
sustain. Ironically, although it is indicated that people were consulted, the same handbook 
has argued that consultation lacks the essence of democratic participation (p.110). The fact 
that people were consulted through surveys does not bring the process any near to 
democratic participation. In addition, citizen participation in the legislative and executive 
arms of government is fundamentally limited because it is only a tiny minority that enjoys 
such participation, as is the case with juries. How the general public would influence these 
bodies is equally problematic. The intimation of citizen participation in the legislature by 
choosing its members and pushing through private bills is difficult to sustain within the 
frameworks of participatory democratic citizenship because elections are periodic and 
independent private member bills are equally rare, although when they are moved, they 
represent party lines of thought and not necessarily citizens’ wishes. 
The way power is conceived and exercised in leadership positions in Malawi overshadows 
the importance of citizen participation. For instance, a political party is defined as “..a 
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group of people who are willing to assume power and to govern the nation…” (PACGEM, 
p.12). This view further holds that the interaction or relationship that exists between the 
parties and the people before any general election is that whereby the parties hold meetings 
and present themselves to the people and explain how they will govern the nation once in 
power. The citizens, on the other hand, are the ones who “… listen and then, in the general 
election, choose the party which will govern them…” (ibid). These conceptions juxtapose 
the electorate and the parties as two different sides working to win against each other. The 
citizens’ responsibilities are similarly reduced to registration, checking the voters’ roll, 
gathering enough information on parties and candidates; respecting the rights of other 
voters, accepting the results and desisting from fraud etc. (Chirwa, Kanyongolo, & 
Kayambazinthu, p.198-199). Grossly missing from such conceptualisations are questions 
of citizen participation in the process of forming opinions about these parties and 
individuals who stand for elections. The citizenship education materials are also silent on 
whether people and parties who stand for election should subject their manifestos to 
continuous public scrutiny and debate. At best, the individual is characterised as someone 
who continuously keeps one’s cards close to one’s chest without ever allowing anyone to 
know them. 
A conception of active citizenship in this regard needs to conceive and define a framework 
of citizenship that enables the continuous participation of all. Irrespective of democracy 
being vulnerable to numerous shapes, the requirement for the development of democratic 
virtues such as meaningful respect of difference, toleration and the spirit in everyone to 
make the public one’s own domain of activity are essential for the cultivation of active 
citizenship. Although the concept of general will is one of the major concepts in 
developing democracy, an over-emphasis of this concept unnecessarily leads to aggregative 
processes. In a way this factor removes the need for a deliberative process where the quest 
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for a consensus is continual and assumes the equality of all involved to initiate and 
participate in the public talk. The quest for an active democratic citizenship would require 
us to create an education model where the conditions for the creation of a deliberative 
citizen are nurtured. In other words, learners need to be developed to make a reasoned 
argument that would be compelling to others while acknowledging the worth and values of 
others. This further means that learners or any democrats for that matter should cultivate 
the skills to co-operate with others while appreciating the perspectives and experiences of 
others (Enslin, Pendlebury, & Tjiattas, 2001. p 116).  
 
5.2.2 Human rights and freedom 
The discussion of human rights and freedoms in Chapter Three (above) acknowledges that 
these two are constitutive features and goals of any democracy (see also Chirwa, et. al. 
p.89-90). They are an entitlement of every person in a democratic nation. Nevertheless, the 
particular way in which human rights and freedoms are brought to bear on people’s daily 
lives indicates whether such a conception can or cannot cultivate active citizenship. In 
Malawi’s citizenship programmes, freedom is conceived as “…the ability to make choices 
or do things without being worried or stopped by others as one creates the political, social 
or economic space between oneself and others …” (op. cit, p.90, emphasis mine). Political 
freedoms are, therefore, characterised by the ability to have one’s views and talk about 
personal thoughts and beliefs, to associate with others and the freedom of movement. On 
the other hand, economic freedoms are marked by the ability to own and use property, to 
work and the absence of forced labour, whereas social freedoms are about equality and 
non-interference in individual privacy and dignity (op. cit. p.91). These conceptions of 
freedom are formal and private or individual orientated. They are silent on whether such 
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individual freedoms take their social positioning seriously in terms of engaging the 
individual holder of the freedoms in interaction for some common or society good. For 
instance, despite the recognition that levels of education are generally low especially 
among females in Malawi and that females have less access to schools and other formal 
educational institutions, the handbook still maintains that everyone has a right to education 
irrespective of these differential circumstances, let alone without mention of the differential 
circumstances as reasons that may deny others the right to education because they cannot 
simply be in school. In this regard, a conception of active citizenship would require strong 
recognition of the differential circumstances people are born into, even in poor rural 
societies; where women and children need special attention for them to realise their 
freedoms and rights to education, for instance. 
The rights and freedoms are conceived and taught as the principles and values of 
democracy. They form part of the heart of the constitution of Malawi (Faiti, p.11; Student 
Teacher Handbook p.3). From the rights enshrined in the constitution arise the freedoms 
that people have in a nation. The materials further hold that people’s knowledge of human 
rights sustains and promotes a democratic culture. Human rights are regarded to be a form 
of citizen empowerment (Gwira Mpini Kwacha, p.14). These include the right to life, 
liberty, equality, respect for human dignity, the right to privacy, freedom of association; the 
rights of a child, women’s rights; freedom of thought, freedom of the press; the right to 
education; culture and language; the right to equal access to justice (Teachers’ Handbook, 
pp 981-987). The nation is expected to protect these individual rights (Gwira Mpini 
Kwacha, p.3). Through such a conception, the individual person and government are set 
apart. There is also a growing indication that if law and order, peace, security and stability 
are enabling conditions to national prosperity and development, then the state is under an 
obligation to provide these to its citizens. This is in addition to expecting the state to make 
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laws and regulations to protect the citizens and their property (Kayambazinthu, et al, p.40). 
In other words, by solely concentrating on knowledge, the materials heavily miss out on 
other equally important enabling conditions for the cultivation of active democratic 
citizenships. The idea that the values should translate into appropriate democratic 
dispositions enabling the citizens to cultivate democratic skills and aptitudes (Crick Report, 
6.8.3, p.41) should have become another central pillar for developing democratic 
citizenship. The conceptualisation given to the rights between the state and individual 
leaves the state and citizens in a ‘clientele’ relationship, requiring no major action from the 
citizens apart from keeping peace, law and order in response to the state keeping its duties 
(p.41-42). Such conceptions resemble Schumpeter’s elite forms of democracy and are 
likely to develop and promote a passive form of citizenship. 
Two forms of rights, already mentioned above, are worth discussing in this particular case. 
These are women’s rights and children’s rights. The two categories have often sparked 
controversy because of diverse historical and cultural backgrounds. For instance, Malawi’s 
cultural practices have for a long time perceived the woman as a second-class citizen, 
subordinate to and servant to a man. On the other hand, children because of age and 
apparent lack of knowledge and full induction into society’s ways have similarly been 
considered second-class citizens. In other words, traditional conceptions of a woman and a 
child ascribe lesser forms of personhood, dignity and status to women and children. This 
historical cultural background necessarily demands a substantive approach to the rights of 
women and children. Instead, women’s and children’s rights are accorded equal and formal 
recognition just as any other rights and without consideration of the historical and cultural 
factors, and how this background affects the execution of such rights. In this regard, the 
idea that the “…presence and absence of a particular group within human rights and how 
such presence or lack of it appears affects the fundamental defining characteristics of those 
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rights…” (Taylor, 1994, p.105) is not considered, thereby putting all women and children, 
all poor and rich under the watchful eye of an abstract and universal construct of rightness. 
Such an approach, as is also the case in Malawi, has negative effects on the right to 
education and is likely to hinder the cultivation of appropriate democratic skills and 
aptitudes for citizenship.  
While it is common knowledge that conditions of schooling in rural and urban areas are not 
the same, a formal recognition of the right to education puts every school going person on 
an equal footing with another. It assumes that differences and fundamental gaps do not 
exist between different categories of people to an extent that they would affect educational 
goals. Therefore, no effort is made to acknowledge difference in social, cultural and 
economic positions and how these affect the teaching of human rights, let alone how rights 
are ascribed to the different categories of people in question. As a result, the approach 
produces different understandings of human rights and freedom because of the influence of 
access and exposure. 
Human rights link up with other equally important issues in citizenship education such as 
issues of governance and development. Chirwa, et. al (2004, Ch.4) connect the importance 
of human rights with the empowerment of individuals and the communities in solving their 
social and economic problems. According to them, human rights observance enables the 
people to maintain their solidarity, which is founded on equal entitlements and dues. 
Human rights are also regarded as a pivot in conflict resolution and solution-seeking 
initiatives in society. On the other hand, the link between human rights and good 
governance comes in through people’s participation. Effective accountability is seen as 
possible only in those cases where the citizens know their rights and duties and duly 
exercise their power to control representatives (p.323). While government and public 
institutions are placed in a position where they need to be transparent in their activities, this 
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transparency does not presuppose that citizens already know how government and public 
institutions are supposed to operate. The call to transparency needs to be accompanied with 
appropriate civic education about the institutions to ensure that citizens know that such 
transparency is meant to enable them to have a say in those public institutions. In so far as 
citizen participation is concerned in things that affect citizens’ life, the citizenship 
education initiative in this source remains non-definitive on the extent of active citizen 
participation. 
Secondly, the connection between human rights, governance and development is central. 
Our discussion in Chapter Four shows that cultivating an active citizenship requires 
parallel processes of development and democratisation. It also requires a republican 
conception of freedom and human rights. The conceptual links between human rights, 
development and democracy in Malawi’s citizenship education are problematic. The 
relationship between these three is framed in legalistic claims and entitlements, thereby 
inducing the same impression seen above of the state as provider and protector of citizen’s 
goods while the citizen waits to be protected and provided for, as the citizen also pursues 
private interests. This understanding has a direct impact on citizens’ responsibilities and 
duties to each other, which are characterised here as the enjoyment of one’s rights without 
interference with and from others. The tit-for-tat conception implied here would rarely 
promote peaceful existence, as the handbook would want us to assume. Citizens’ 
responsibilities to the state emerge as an exchange for the benefits one gets by living in a 
community of democracy (Chirwa, et. al. pp337-340).  
Citizenship education on rights and freedoms promotes a limited conception of citizen 
engagement by assuming that one’s responsibilities towards other individuals are met 
through abiding by the constitution in terms of respecting equal dignity and equal status 
before the law. Even the Biblical dictum that “…you do unto other what you would like 
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them to do to you…” (op. cit., p.338) as an international measure of how human rights 
agreements impose responsibilities of non-interference into other people’s freedoms is not  
a sufficient condition to enable the cultivation of active democratic citizenship. On the 
other hand, citizenship education in Malawi requires the teaching of human rights where 
sufficient consideration is made of the problems, dilemmas and confrontations in the 
conception and application of rights and freedoms. This consideration needs to take us to 
the recognition and appropriate use of difference; that other sections of society even within 
the school environment require more and explicit social recognition and action in order for 
them to realise their freedoms and rights. Rather than putting tradition and modernity in 
stark confrontation, learners in schools need to be taught how they can engage with both as 
they try to realise everyone’s freedoms and rights. This approach can ensure that both unity 
and diversity are understood and used to enhance development and democracy.  
The approach in teaching human rights and freedoms by avoiding deeper and controversial 
issues that leads to formal and surface treatment of these issues needs to be replaced by 
teaching the very controversial issues we are dodging, such as the practical relationship 
between individual rights and social obligations. Rights related to individual sexual matters 
are also controversial especially that Malawi predominantly favours cultural and religious 
traditional sexual morals. There is also a need for schools to promote the right to have a 
view and the right to speak about one’s formed views in public without fear of reprisals or 
social exclusion. The teaching of such issues will enable learners to strengthen their 
spiritual, moral, social and cultural development (Crick Report, p. 36). There are a number 
of merits to this approach. Other than generating knowledge, the teaching of controversial 
issues prepares learners to properly situate themselves within the social, political and 
cultural milieu, thereby providing them with appropriate skills of engaging with difference, 
finding their spaces as active agents in society. This way of educating learners renews their 
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sense of duties and responsibilities as they also develop skills necessary for sustaining a 
culture of democracy. A long-term concentration on formal freedoms and rights is likely to 
hinder the very promotion of active citizenship. 
 
5.2.3 Democracy and development in Malawi’s citizenship education 
Good leaders promote the development of their area whereas bad leaders bring 
problems that may retard development (Gwira Mpini Kwacha, p.14).  
The concept of development that is promoted in citizenship education in Malawi is largely 
leader-driven. It is assumed that it is the type of leadership that affects the nature and pace 
of development. For instance, NICE laments, “… in spite of the political transition from 
one party to a multiparty system of government, Malawi continues to reel under the legacy 
of the one party state. She continues to suffer from abject poverty, high incidence of 
HIV/AIDS; a higher illiteracy rate and she is largely ill-prepared and ill-informed to 
actively and effectively participate in the democratic process to contribute to the country’s 
development…” (Faiti, p.2). Hence development and democracy are linked. The second 
periodisation of citizenship education, according to NICE, concentrates on HIV/AIDS, 
environment, gender, health, youth empowerment, and poverty and food security. Although 
this appears maximal in its approach, there is a consistent shift from being political to 
being apolitical, to divorce development from politics (see also Englund, 2004, p.12). Such 
shifts demand a proper re-conceptualisation of the relationship between development and 
democracy. 
Others parade adequate resources as a condition for the enjoyment of social and economic 
rights. These resources include education, health and other social services which 
government has to provide to its people. Given that Malawi has a low GDP and widespread 
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poverty, they also argue that government cannot afford to pay for these services for the 
people (Chirwa, et. al., op. cit.). As such, the argument claims that poverty puts Malawi in 
an awkward situation where neither government can provide for people’s basic needs nor 
can the people provide for themselves. This understanding assumes a maximalist 
perspective. Nevertheless, the maximal implications do not go far enough because of the 
apparent equation between low GDP and poverty with eventual lack of citizen 
participation. The Afrobarometer (Briefing Paper No.4) shows that such an equation is 
erroneous.  
There is some evidence of maximalist elements in the assumed relationship between 
democracy, human rights and development (Chirwa, Kanyongolo & Kayambazinthu, 
p.304-305). For instance, one’s rights include “… the right to be a central subject of 
development; the right to participate in development; the right to fair distribution of 
development benefits and the right to development itself…” (p.117). While the promotion 
of human rights as a drive towards self-determination has maximalist implications, these 
sentiments are overridden by minimalist conceptions when the right to achieve and live to 
one’s potential become an individual’s own prerogative (op. cit., p.316). Hence minimal 
conceptions become predominant, as development is understood to lean heavily on formal 
concepts and formal recognition of human rights.  
Malawi’s approach to citizenship education includes the idea that development comes from 
the investment of financial and technical resources and the proper utilisation of natural 
resources; and that the misuse of resources results in distorted patterns of development 
where some areas become more developed than others (op. cit.). Although poverty and 
development acquire minimalist technical expressions, some recognition of human 
capability is made (p.235). This idea is maximal. Poverty puts one in a state of continuous 
deprivation and is antithetical to development. While it may be true that the poor have less 
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capacity to participate in productive activities, it is again difficult to ascertain that they 
would not actively participate in their political system given the opportunity.  
Poverty Alleviation Programmes are refereed to as development projects. Other similar 
programmes include the Malawi Poverty Reduction Strategy (MPRS), the Malawi Social 
Action Fund (MASAF), the Targeted Input Programme (TIP), The Decentralization 
Programme, the Youth Fund and the Free Primary Education. These programmes are 
designed to address the needs of the poor. Most of these programmes, except for free 
primary education, target the economic upliftment of the citizens; and it is assumed that 
increased participation of citizens in the economic activities of the country would lead to 
their development (Chirwa, et. al., p.238-242). MASAF, for instance is said to provide 
direct employment, provide food safety nets, and enable government to monitor levels of 
poverty (241). Interestingly, the conception of development that is harboured in these 
programmes leans more on economic and material development other than holistic human 
development. MASAF is a loan from the World Bank for infrastructural development. 
With regard to MASAF phases 1 and 2, the citizens had a say only in terms of indicating 
what needed to be constructed in their area.10 The structure of the programme was such 
that it recruited village volunteers to work on the project for a daily pay. The projects were 
directly under the district coordinator. The village committees were there to see to it that 
there were enough people working on the project. As an employed provider, the project 
recruited people only from its own catchment area and the expert subcontracted to do the 
project had nothing much to do with recruitment. The MASAF programme is meant to 
provide “direct employment to poor families to provide safety nets in poor and food 
deficient areas through food-for-work, among others” (p.241). The framework of MASAF 
                                                
10 There is indication that MASAF Phase III has taken a different approach of locating all the 
processes from project proposal to implementation in the local people themselves (Liwonde, 
MASAF Official, 10-01-05). Efforts to source official documents on this shift proved futile  
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I and II puts doubt on the extent to which people are free and participate in shaping their 
social, economic and political life as claimed by some of the civic programmes. 
Formulation is by elite members whereas implementation is motivated by the need to 
survive. It is the impoverished livelihoods that are expected to participate so that they 
sustain themselves. As such a conception of democratic citizenship arising from these 
sources is likely to promote passive citizenship because its conception of citizen 
participation is narrow. 
Nevertheless, in a few cases, the citizenship education materials come to terms with a 
United Nations perspective on development that is people-centred. A people centred 
conception of development measures development in terms of the dignity and value of 
people that is promoted and protected. In order to do this, the development rating considers 
such factors as adequate food, clothing, housing, medical care, education, work and 
sustainable environment as integral to the defining development.  
Human rights are central to the promotion of development that focuses on people 
because the rights empower people not only to satisfy their basic needs but also 
to realise their full potential as human beings (p.324) 
This view of development involves all aspects of human existence, although it makes 
entitlement the major condition for people realising their full potential. Nevertheless, a 
rights perspective still dodges such understanding because Chirwa argues that a “person 
who has a right has the legal power to compel the relevant duty-bearer to deliver services 
or goods to which the right-holder is entitled” (p.324). But in this case, the rights have a 
maximal implication only if people actively and continuously demand of their government 
to provide for necessary conditions through which people would partake of their own 
development. While a culture of human rights is regarded to assign duties and obligations 
amongst which development would be delivered, a conception of formal rights and 
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freedoms within the development discourse is likely to remove the dynamism and the 
reciprocity of human beings that is usually engaged with when development takes place. 
Recognition and respect for human rights, though, provide a conducive environment for 
development to take place.  
This section concludes that although in some cases gestures are made towards a maximalist 
conception of the relationship between democracy and development, to a large extent 
development is understood as something people have to be given and not as something 
they participate in through all its processes. This conception is more likely to cultivate non-
engaging citizens in the processes of their development.   
 
5.3 A knowledge or a practise-based approach to citizenship education in 
Malawi? A concluding remark. 
The argument that has been defended above does not conclude that a knowledge-based 
approach to citizenship is wholly useless. On the other hand, effort has been paid to 
showing that an over-emphasis on knowledge is likely to contribute to develop passive 
citizens. Most of Malawi’s citizenship education is pre-occupied with providing “general 
information on the rights of individuals in a democratic society and on how democracy 
works” (PACGEM Handbook, Foreword, p. 2). Knowledge of the constitution, government 
and functions of civil society groups become prominent. This approach tends to present 
civic education information in an apparently neutral manner thereby making the materials 
and consequent action non-controversial, not appealing for people’s consequent civic 
action. Englund’s analysis of the programmes and approaches of NICE indicates that at a 
time when other civic education groups in Malawi were engaged in heated debates about 
extending the presidential term of office to three from two, NICE became very non-
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committal. This was done in order to make NICE appear a neutral organization (2004, 
pp11-13). But the idea that civic educators keep their political opinions to themselves in 
such controversial issues defeats the purpose of creating active citizens in a nation. It 
introduces dualistic forms in educating people for democratic participation. It makes them 
assume that democracy and democratic participation should not evoke the dilemmas and 
contradictions of public life. 
What this chapter has tried to show is that education for democratic citizenship in Malawi 
needs to be understood within its political, historical, social and economic context. This 
consideration reveals that if a nation like Malawi wants to cultivate active citizens who 
meaningfully take part in the affairs of the nation then a strong citizenship education built 
on the values of deliberative democracy needs to be cultivated. The current citizenship 
education efforts in Malawi come in as an intervention to a long period of strong 
hegemonic culture that sought to train citizens as subjects of the ruling regime, where 
difference was heretical instead of being a resource and nothing other than the single party 
and its members existed. This exposition finally indicates that in so far as teaching for 
democracy is concerned, Malawi’s approaches concentrate on imparting formal knowledge 
of democratic principles and structures and how these things are supposed to operate, and 
is very likely to promote passive citizenship. 
While this exposition recognises the importance of teaching issues such as the electoral 
system and its associated citizen rights and duties, the electoral process alone is not 
sufficient for cultivating active citizenship although it can be a legitimate indicator. A 
young democracy like Malawi would need to be grounded on sound democratic principles 
and liberal democratic principles are required for this. Nevertheless, more is required to 
cultivate and sustain democratic citizenship than the aforementioned. The knowledge base 
or understanding that is built around democratic principles needs to be supported by 
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appropriate social and moral responsibility, and community involvement (Crick Report, 
2.10, p.11). But these obligations cannot be fulfilled if learners are not prepared to accept 
substantive and intractable disagreements on basic questions as part of the whole 
deliberative process. Cultivating the required dispositions and skills for such democratic 
life requires that learners are led to engage in critical reflection on their own views so that 
they manage to consider what would count as good reasons from other people’s 
perspectives (Enslin, Pendlebury & Tjiattas, 2001, p.124).  
This approach seeks to include all perspectives in those concerned even if these are 
different. The form of citizenship education that can develop these capacities in learners is 
that where the common grounds for conversation are promoted, where learners are lead in 
practical terms to develop discussion, communication and teamwork skills (Crick Report, 
3.11, p.16); where apart from learning to argue cogently and effectively, they are also 
enabled to think for themselves and apply the required democratic skills and aptitudes. 
Therefore the cultivation of active democratic citizenship requires that in school practices 
learners become involved in discussion and consultation on matters of school life that 
concern them and about which they can be expected to develop reasonable views. Whether 
in or out of school, this conception also provides for the involvement of people in 
identifying, planning, executing and evaluating projects in their societies.  
The current approaches to citizenship education in Malawi are too dependent on a 
representative conception of democracy and a minimalist notion of citizenship. These 
approaches need to incorporate the practical cultivation of democratic skills of tolerance, 
respect for diversity and difference, co-operation, critical reflection and deliberation using 
diverse modes as basic necessities for the development of active democratic citizenship. 
Participatory forms of democracy coupled with republican conceptions of freedom and 
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rights, a re-orientation of the link between democracy and development provide suitable 
conditions for this goal.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
EDUCATING FOR ACTIVE DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP: A 
CONCLUSION 
6.0 Introduction 
The notion of citizenship is complex and heavily contested, and as a result citizenship 
education takes varied forms. For instance, proponents of (elite) representation, like 
Schumpeter, argue that representation is the only practicable way of conducting democracy 
while others, such as Budge, think that representation should never override direct citizen 
participation because of the merits of participation in the education for the democratic 
citizens. This dissertation has endeavoured to explore the tensions and ambiguities that 
exist between representative and participatory forms of democracy; between contestatory 
forms, and formal and abstract notions of freedom and rights; and the dichotomous 
relations frequently assumed between development and democratic participation and 
citizenship. This examination, of the shifts and tensions, has also used McLaughlin’s 
(1992) maximal-minimal conceptual framework. Just as maximal and minimal forms of 
citizenship exist as discrete conceptions; it is not possible to exclude representative forms 
of democracy, and formal and abstract conceptions of freedom and human rights. But it is 
clear that efforts to cultivate a democratic active citizenship need to go beyond these 
formal conceptions and actively engage citizens. In other words, the dissertation contends 
that participatory forms of democracy along with republican forms of freedom and human 
rights are a pre-requisite for the education and development of such active citizenship. 
Malawi’s citizenship education partially achieves this goal. However, the over-emphasis on 
what citizens need to know is at the expense of the virtues and dispositions that citizens 
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need to cultivate. The following is a summation of the case for democratic active 
citizenship in Malawi. 
 
6.1 The preference for participatory models of democratic citizenship  
The two competing approaches to democracy outlined above (chapter two), representative 
democracy and participatory democracy, can be understood within a continuum of citizen 
participation. Mention of both forms as in practice in Malawi is not surprising, though 
ambiguous because the maximal characterisation do not exist with the same impact as the 
minimal characterisations (see Chirwa, et. al. p.93-94). The practise of democracy in 
Malawi leans more towards the limited forms of representative democracy, which are also 
formal and legal. Citizenship education programmes focus more on formal meanings; 
constituents and principles of democracy (Teacher Development Unit; Cairns & Dambula, 
1996; Chirwa, et. al., 2004) than on the virtues and dispositions that citizens require for 
effective participation. Participatory forms only exist as constituents of the mixed form of 
democracy and are given lip service; hence they are also minimal. This approach is more 
likely to create a favourable ground for the promotion of passive citizens at the expense of 
participative citizens.  
Although some forms of representative democracy can be participatory in the sense of 
engaging citizens into multiple forms of social arrangements (see Section 2.2; Pitkin, 
1996), an examination of Malawi’s case indicates that elite forms of representation offer a 
more competitive form of democracy and are predominant. The periodic elections and 
issues of political leadership receive marked emphasis. Although elite democracy 
differentiates the education of leaders from that of the masses by specifying levels of 
knowledge expected for each group, such differentiation is not very explicit in Malawi. But 
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in general, circumstances relating to citizenship education are such that they favour 
representative democracy, hence they are likely to fail to prepare citizens adequately for 
democratic participation.  
We argue that the pattern is Schumpeterian because by giving everyone formal knowledge, 
the cultivation of skills and democratic dispositions is withheld from the citizens. Some 
think that teaching citizens the different systems of government and their challenges, and 
also the system of human rights should consolidate democracy and legally defend it 
(Chirwa, et. al). This approach, while good at giving out the basic knowledge and 
information about democratic systems and expectations is not enough to foster active 
citizenship. It promotes a limited conception of democratic citizenship and only pays lip-
service to participation as essential for democracy. For instance, the ideas that 
“…democracy is a way of life..” (Chirwa, et. al., p.20) and that people have a right to 
political participation are maximal, but prioritising knowledge alongside these ideas 
reduces them to minimal conceptions. Again, the ideas that democratic participation 
involves people’s participation through a parliament, juries and cabinet as Chirwa et al 
(2004, p.112) would have us believe are essentially minimal. Parliamentary consultations 
are rare, the practise of juries is confined to the three high courts in Malawi, and the cabinet 
posts are not fully representative of the people because of their limited numbers, selection 
and functions. Hence, the ways through which these people will participate are not 
extensive enough to allow for a wide citizenship engagement.  
While it is the case that “…education must involve knowledge and understanding…” 
(Peters, 1966, p.45), an education for democratic citizenship requires more than just 
information on constitutions, systems of government and the legal system and its 
operations. This would produce a certain form of ‘philosophic education’, which would 
commit itself to seeking the truth and promoting a rational inquiry (McLaughlin, 1992, p. 
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238); but this would not support the democratic political community we live in. Such 
philosophic education tends to produce “…unreflective socialisation into the political and 
social status quo…” (ibid) and cannot lead to active democratic participation. McLaughlin 
suggests that cultivation of active democratic citizens crucially depends on the cultivation 
of a more extensive range of dispositions and virtues in addition to the broad critical 
understanding (ibid). In other words, a citizenship education that over-concentrates on the 
knowledge base virtually becomes insufficient for the cultivation of active democratic 
citizenship, according to McLaughlin (1992). 
Aggregational tendencies are at odds with the cultivation of an active, deliberative and 
democratic citizenship. Barber’s (1984) understanding of the political as arising “when 
some action of public consequence becomes necessary and people make a public choice 
that is reasonable in the face of conflict despite the absence of an independent ground of 
judgement” (p.132) requires a deliberative and a participatory framework. Barber proposes 
an approach to democratic participation that refuses aggregational processes and settles for 
continuous deliberation in the public arena of all that concerns everyone. In other words, 
decisions that affect a group of people have to be the outcome of free and reasoned 
deliberation among equals, reached by the principles of equality and symmetry (Benhabib 
1996, p.68-70). But it is also the case that such a process would need to recognise that all 
can initiate speech, interrogate and debate issues using forms of expression and language 
that would best enable individuals to do this (see also Young, 1996). The communicative 
and deliberative model is more likely to educate for active democratic citizenship, where 
“…citizenship becomes its own training ground and participation its own tutor…” (Barber, 
p. 152). By providing sufficient enabling conditions for participation, the enabling 
conditions for reciprocity and mutuality are also set. These conditions provide the 
necessary grounds for public action. 
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In view of the above-mentioned ideals, teaching for democratic citizenship in Malawi 
requires a fundamental turning-around in order to incorporate the development of skills and 
aptitudes. Learners need to be taught to embrace the democratic value of tolerating 
difference; i.e. that difference is at the very heart of democratic practice. Practically, this 
requirement implies that learners be encouraged to engage and discuss in and outside 
school such controversial issues as inter- and intra-party conflicts, why some people are 
banned from their parties or choose to leave the parties they joined, the multiplication of 
political parties; that talking politics no more becomes a taboo and becomes everyone’s 
responsibility. Much more than this, learners should be given the skills to deliberate and 
dialogue with those regarded to hold beliefs and opinions different from their own. 
The tendency to think representatives, by virtue of their office, know what is good for the 
represented is another limitation to active participation in Malawi. Schooling, therefore, 
needs to provide more enabling conditions for the active involvement of learners if they are 
to effectively have a say in all matter that concern them. One way of doing this is to allow 
class representatives to handle issues only after they have been thoroughly exhausted at 
class level by the participation of everyone. For instance, learners can deliberate on issues 
such as their disciplinary system, how justice should be administered in their school and 
how they would want disputes amongst themselves to be settled. If learners are led to the 
cultivation of these skills, it is very likely that they will also be empowered to initiate 
speech, interrogate and debate issues meaningfully. This democratic mandate means that 
learners should also be motivated to raise pertinent issues that affect their lives and the 
school even if the teachers and the parents association have not raised them. 
There are many more things that learners in schools could do in order to acquire the skills 
to become active democracy citizens. Most of the skills suggested above require the 
capacity to listen to others even if their point may not be expressed in the most rational way 
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or even if they personally do not agree with the ideas. The cultivation of a deliberative 
democratic character is indispensable for Malawi. Gould (1990), who we have discussed in 
Chapter One, argues that the cultivation of democratic agency and democratic reciprocity 
are necessary pillars for active democratic citizenship. Learners and indeed all citizens in 
Malawi need to be encouraged to develop a sense of ownership of the democratic process. 
But for all this to be possible, no one position should be privileged as people deliberate. 
The requirements for the cultivation of active citizenship put a number of demands on the 
school curriculum. If learners are expected to discuss and communicate their views fully; if 
they are to argue effectively on their positions, negotiate successfully across difference and 
cooperate with others, then it is not the duty of the subject of Social Studies alone. These 
skills and aptitudes can better developed if they are included in all school curricula; and 
that it becomes the duty of all people involved in the life of the school, learners, teachers, 
parents and government or proprietors, if the school is private. 
 
6.2 Beyond a formal human rights education approach for democratic citizens 
The programs for consolidating democracy in Malawi need to go beyond the present 
formal explanations of human rights involving among other things, definitions, sources, 
classifications, protection of rights and other human rights instruments, thereby confining 
democratic participation to a rights approach. Malawi’s human rights approaches are also 
essentially knowledge based and give a broad spectrum of political ideas. Democracy is 
seen as “…a continuous process of promoting, respecting and upholding people’s rights 
and freedoms, equality of persons…” (Chirwa, et. al, p.88–91); promoting the respect for 
law and order (p.40).  In fact the whole question of strengthening governance institutions 
and promoting development is regarded to be founded and operating on the existence and 
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connection between civil and political rights (p.302). Similarly, the state-citizen 
relationship acquires ‘clientele’ marks. The teaching on human rights in Malawi formalises 
human rights to the extent that democratic diversity in human rights is submerged. Human 
rights are presented as neat and straightforward issues that have to be applied across the 
board without any consideration of the differences that exist between people and their life 
circumstances.  
The above approach has several limitations. At the heart of this formalism is the 
assumption that what is important is merely the knowledge that democratic citizens need to 
acquire about human rights. In effect, this approach assumes practice to be an inevitable 
consequence of the knowledge base approach, which is not necessarily the case. In a 
formalistic and abstract manner, human rights are framed and taught through such items as 
the constitution, voter education, bill of rights and the operations of the legal system (see 
also Carrim, et.al, 2000, p.34). Such an approach removes the controversies, the steam and 
makes human rights issues apolitical. It turns them into ready-made products to be applied 
in all circumstances without even having a critical perspective on their applicability. This 
has become the comfort zone of many civic educators in Malawi such as NICE and the 
Democracy Consolidation programme, despite its negative effects of not educating citizens 
for democratic participation.  
In order to promote active and strong citizenship, the human rights programmes and 
approaches to human freedom in Malawi need to go beyond the formal presentation, which 
is knowledge-based. The teaching for democratic citizenship is likely to produce active 
citizenship if issues surrounding human rights are understood and practised in full 
awareness of the dilemmas and the confrontations that arise from them. Human rights 
approaches that are likely to promote active citizenship are also expected to operate and 
work not only from their legal but also moral perspectives and implications (Enslin & 
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Pendlebury, op. cit.). For instance, the implementation of the right to equality needs to be 
understood and made to apply while at the same time acknowledging that certain sections 
of society require a stronger affirmation of their rights. In this regard, schools can 
effectively bring this into effect by requiring that boys and girls participate equally in the 
activities of the school, that there are equal numbers of boys and girls in positions; and that 
in practice the roles of the boys and the girls are given equal status. More than this, the 
roles of girls need to be supported strongly in order to defuse the cultural oppression of 
women. This practice is more likely to develop skills of active participation in all members 
of the school, and the commitment to make the object of right truly secure as they work for 
its political realization (see also Pogge, 2002). Of‘course it can be counter-argued to say: 
What is if the girls and other traditional minorities do not want to participate? While it is 
true that not all girls and other excluded groups would opt to participate, the practice of 
democratic inclusion, even by a small number at the beginning, has the capacity to 
motivate others to participate. Participation breeds knowledge and interest. 
The teaching of human rights in schools is not a matter of one subject or learning area. 
School curriculum and ethos needs to be infused with human rights. In other words, the 
school needs officially to insist school members to manifest behaviour that respects and 
promotes human rights at school and in society. The limitations to some human rights 
approaches as discussed above can be overcome by a practical consideration and 
discussion of the responsibilities and duties that human rights place on members of society. 
There is a temptation here to go formal in order to avoid confrontation of different rights-
claims. This approach, which is likely to avoid the central issues in human rights practice 
in the long run, can be refreshed so that it considers the dilemmas and confrontations and 
how they affect human rights practice. Some of the controversial issues in school include 
freedom of conscience and religion and the democratic requirement to consider others as 
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equals and their views as equally demanding respect even if they may go against what we 
believe in. The cultivation of these attitudes to the promotion of human rights has more 
benefit of striking a middle ground between the apparent divergent human rights claims of 
individuals and the value of diversity that democratic society should promote and protect. 
 
6.3 Education for active democratic citizenship and development  
Citizenship education programmes in Malawi reflect a dichotomy in the relationship 
between civic duties and national development. Among other things, the thinking that ‘all 
people’ need to be involved in a development partnership between government and civil 
society is not specific enough on the roles citizens will play since the system basically 
operates within a representative conception of democracy (see Chirwa, et al, 2004). Despite 
having maximal overtones, the above perspective has inbuilt limitations that make the 
approach not as maximalist is it appears. The involvement of all stakeholders in 
development requires such involvement to be concurrent with people’s political 
participation. Development and democratic participation need to be understood as two 
sides of the same coin. People’s participation is not only a right but it is also a 
responsibility and a democratic obligation.  
The current forms of citizenship education in Malawi are likely to produce minimalist 
virtues by making people concentrate on loyalties and responsibilities that are local and 
immediate. The invitation for people to participate in developing local areas where 
individuals live needs to be made alongside the invitation to participate in the way politics 
and democracy operate. The idea that people should not bring politics into development 
work because the former retards the latter is at odds with the demands for active 
democratic participation. On the other hand, development and democratisation need to go 
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hand in hand. Engagement in public matters should no more take the form of voluntary 
work, because this approach creates weaker social obligations and also conditions the 
promotion of passive citizenship. The maximal approach offers an extended sense of the 
loyalties and responsibilities beyond the immediate and local concerns, where individual 
citizens become more concerned with issues of justice extending to a wider horizon. The 
ideal being advocated here finds the ideals of ‘advocacy’ and ‘lobbying’ present in 
Malawi’s citizenship education (Chirwa, et. al, p.113) inadequate to help cultivate active 
democratic citizenship because of their limitations in promoting extended citizen 
democratic involvement. 
The sense of direct participation of people in development programmes in Malawi is 
equally dubious. Chirwa, et. al. (2004) assume that citizens participate in developing 
policies of programmes such as MASAF, Vision 2020 and MPRS (ibid). But the sense of 
direct and participatory democracy assumed here does not have any strong semblance with 
the essence of direct and participatory democracy as explained by Budge (1993), Barber 
(1984) and others. The MASAF Project promotes doubt on the extent to which active 
citizenship would be engaged except for the fact that it creates a huge labour demand, 
which in turn provides employment to the villagers. Hence participation in MASAF 
projects does not have the conditions to cultivate active democratic citizenship. For citizen 
participation in MASAF to acquire democratic significance the orientation of the whole 
programme would need to change so that the citizens are involved in all the stages of the 
programme. In this regard, citizens would need to be engaged in the conception of the 
programme, planning (which includes, among other things, agreeing on how to source and 
resource the programme), implementation, and evaluation. In so far as MASAF I is 
concerned, citizens were contracted as labourers, an ideal far apart from participatory 
requirements in democracy. On the other hand, Vision 2020 is a project aimed at finding 
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people’s aspirations and attempts to map what the nation needs to achieve by the year 
2020. The people’s participation involved providing a vision, but only a small 
representative sample was contacted. The limitations on consultation in the sense of 
seeking specialist knowledge puts doubt on the extent to which we can claim Vision 2020 
to be participatory. Vision 2020 needed greater involvement of all citizens at community. 
This would also help create a sense of ownership for the goals and implementation of the 
vision. The MPRS is primarily a requirement of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and it aims to “achieve sustainable poverty reduction through socio-economic and political 
empowerment of the poor” (p.239). Within this programme, the pillar of good governance 
is meant to “ensure that public and civil society institutions and programmes protect and 
benefit the poor” (ibid). By treating the poor as an object, these programmes lead to 
minimalist conceptions of democracy. 
While the above the above programmes only begin to set the pace for the link between 
development and democracy, they fall short of adequate citizen involvement. The 
programmes do not meet the favourable conditions for the creation of participative and 
deliberative citizens in a democracy. For these programmes to assist in the cultivation of 
active democratic citizenship, the recognition and engagement of urgency of the citizens is 
irrevocable. Sen (1999) and Ake (1996) provide us with important tools of engaging 
democracy and development simultaneous and as two sides of the same process. By 
engaging with the people’s sense of freedom as the major goal of development, it would be 
possible to take the citizens “…as the agents, means as well as the ends of (their) 
development…” (Ake, 140-1). This would enable the people to participate and become part 
of the development and democratisation process. Hence development and democracy 
would both engage in promoting the capacities and the faculties people have in order to 
live better lives. Such an approach seeks to broaden the way freedom, let alone 
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development, are conceived (Sen, 1999) and the extent to which citizens participate in 
matters relating to their society.  
This dissertation considers that by reconceptualising development and democracy in this 
way, more enabling conditions for the cultivation of active citizens would be created. The 
school’s mandate in this regard is to encourage and lead learners to engage in development 
as involving the expansion and exercise of their freedoms, and not merely to consider 
development as technological advancement. The cultivation of values, skills and 
dispositions that we have discussed earlier would be promoted by requiring community 
involvement of learners; in as far as this is practicable. Community involvement is likely to 
provide learners with first-hand experience of their civic responsibilities as well as create in 
them a capacity for joint problem solving skills. In addition, learners should also be 
encouraged to take care of school facilities and consider these facilities as their own. In this 
regard, it can improve the way learners see their environment if they are made to contribute 
toward the renovation of the facilities and not only when one has damaged part of these 
facilities. This approach has better chances of slowing the rate of property breakage in most 
schools which is mostly blamed on democracy and its freedoms.  
 
6.4 Final Remarks 
This dissertation has argued that Malawi requires cultivating active democratic citizenship 
virtues and skills both for the life of democracy itself and the building of a proper 
relationship between development and democracy. As such, it has also laboured to show 
that participatory democracy along with republican and contestatory forms of freedoms and 
human rights create more conditions for the cultivation of active democratic citizenship. 
This argument has been made through a number of ways. In the first place, an exposition of 
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Malawi’s historical and traditional context indicates that concerted efforts towards 
participatory citizenship are required if democracy is to be strengthened and protected. The 
cultivation of a democratic character that is marked by democratic reciprocity and agency 
is also central to this project in order to offset the effects of negative traditional forms of 
leadership and the political culture that was instilled by the single party regime after 
independence. 
In order build a strong democracy, it has been shown that a maximal, participatory 
conception of democracy is more appropriate than a minimal, representative one. Current 
approaches to citizenship education in Malawi are too dependent on a representative 
conception of democracy and a minimalist notion of citizenship. Representative forms of 
democracy provide formal and abstract conceptions of rights and freedoms, the basic 
knowledge system for democratic culture to be built on, but they do not go far enough in 
developing democratic skills and aptitudes that would enable the cultivation of active 
citizenship. Hence the long tradition of political hegemony, illiteracy and others makes the 
adoption and promotion of representative models of democracy and citizen participation in 
Malawi risks the nation’s own democratic goal. Democratic values and dispositions, skills 
and aptitudes, demand more than just knowledge. They demand participative public action 
by a democratic character.  
Malawi’s democratic citizenship education requires the cultivation of a republican 
conception of freedom because such a conception is more suited to citizenship education 
for participatory democracy than a negative, liberal one. Here again, this dissertation does 
not claim that all liberal conceptions are at odds with the development of active citizenship. 
A positive conception provides the ground for democratic agency. Education for 
democratic citizenship in Malawi needs to enable the citizens to find meaning and discover 
their freedom in the public sphere where activity becomes the mark of one’s civic duties. 
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This approach is more likely to stimulate people’s interest in public affairs and educate 
them about this public domain. On the other hand, a formal conception of human rights that 
focuses mainly on the constitution does not encourage citizens to become involved in 
public affairs. 
Education for democratic citizenship requires schools to promote a healthy engagement of 
the dilemmas, tensions and contradictions that issues of human rights and freedoms pose 
for democratic life in society. In this case, the distinction between maximal and minimal 
conceptions of citizenship education will lie on the extent to which human rights issues are 
taken as matters of practice and not merely knowledge. The effectiveness of any human 
rights approach is tested in people’s application of the said bodies of knowledge and their 
capacity to demand participation in the protection and enhancement of these rights and 
freedoms. With this process, citizens are likely to broaden their critical awareness of how 
differences of social, economic and political position affect their overall social conditions 
and the freedom to live the lives they have reason to. 
The discussion of the major themes in democratic citizenship has also led to an 
examination of the dominant approach to development in Malawi. It concludes that the 
dominant approach creates an erroneous dichotomy between development and democracy. 
In order to promote active democratic citizenship, the dissertation argues, in line with Sen 
(1999) and Ake (1996) that a broader concept of the meaning and implications of 
development be embraced. 
In conclusion, I have argued that while an exposure-based approach is not wholly 
inappropriate, it is not sufficient for the education of active democratic citizenship. It does 
not provide substantive ways of cultivating civic action. Instead, it minimizes people’s 
chances of participating in their democratic processes since such approaches “…lack of 
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engagement with what they would mean in particular cases with specific people in actual 
circumstances” (Carrim, 2000, p.36; see also McLaughlin, 1992. pp.237-238). With 
particular reference to Malawi, this dissertation defends a participatory mode of democracy 
because of its stronger merits in developing and educating citizens for active democratic 
participation as well as striking a healthy conception of the link between politics and 
development. Only such an effort can create the conditions to offset the limited conception 
found in her initiatives for democracy and democratic citizenship.  
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